1	Vancouver, BC
2	January 24, 2012
3	(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 10:12 A.M.)
4	THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Good morning. I want to make a few
6	preliminary comments before beginning this
7	morning.
8	Speaking to the future through
9	recommendations as a fundamental aspect of my
10	mandate which I'm empowered to exercise through a
11	process which will enable me to do so effectively
12	and efficiently, understanding past events is
13	important to properly discharge this commission's
14	responsibility to make findings and
15	recommendations. In informing and bringing
16	recommendations I must have regard to a wide range
17	of considerations, including A, the tragic
18	circumstances of the victims and the profound
19	impact that has had on friends, family and their
20	communities, as well as the abhorrence that these
21	crimes have had in the minds and hearts of the
22	public in this region, in this province, and in
23	this country. B, the protection of many women and
24	children with marginalized communities who for
25	many reasons and circumstances are involved in the

sex trade. The structures, the operations of 1 2 policing authorities whose integrity and 3 effectiveness have been questioned, and the 4 individual officers working within them whose 5 reputations, careers and lives have become 6 implicated in these events. The implication of 7 these events in undermining the public's 8 confidence in the policing institutions and its 9 leaders and officers in the discharge of its responsibilities into the future within the 10 11 communities at large, and especially with respect 12 to those most vulnerable with marginalized 13 communities. 14 Sadly, grotesque serial crimes have happened 15 before in BC, in Canada and in many countries including the US and the United Kingdom. Many 16 reviews of these notorious serial crimes have 17 produced important reports. I am particularly 18 19 mindful of the guidance offered by the 20 distinguished Mr. Justice Archie Campbell

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It is often the case that systemic failures as opposed to individual mistakes are the real cause of public disasters and the most

following a review of the Bernardo case wherein he

stated as follows:

appropriate focus of public inquiries. The 1 2 public identification of individual mistakes 3 or wrong doings, while important, does not 4 necessarily address the underlying problem, 5 and unless the underlying problem is addressed the same mistakes or wrongdoing 6 7 will likely occur again if the system that 8 permitted them is not fixed. It is a mistake 9 for a Royal Commission or public inquiry to focus exclusively on a search for scapegoats 10 11 when the failure really is an institutional failure in the sense of a lack of an 12 13 appropriate system or systems, a lack of reasonable resources, a flawed institutional 14 15 culture or a breakdown in the machinery of accountability, but these problems do not go 16 away simply because individuals have been 17 18 implicated. These problems only go away when 19 people change their systems, their attitudes 20 and the way they do business. 21 In The Conduct of Public Inquiries: Law, 22 Policy and Practice Professor Ratushny made the 23 following comments: 24 While systemic issues have been intangible at 25 first, they often emerge as issues such as

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leadership, relationships, morale, past practices and institutional culture. They are essentially any factors that transcend individual conduct but influence events including individual conduct. They may impose rigidity in dealing with the problems or create gaps by discouraging co-operation and co-ordination. They may generate insensitivity and create barriers. They often do not appear to be offensive on their face, but only upon understanding their influence on consequences.

Thus far the evidence before me raises the same concerns that Mr. Justice Campbell and Professor Ratushny highlighted with respect to systemic failures. Where systemic failures have been identified in these reports the simple fact is that even if every individual officer did their job the overall job did not get done. Mr. Justice Campbell puts the point in this way:

> The Bernardo case shows that the motivation, investigative skill and the dedication of officers is not enough. The work of the most dedicated, skillful and highly motivated investigators, supervisors and forensic

1 scientists can be defeated by the lack of an 2 effective case management system, and the 3 lack of systems to ensure communication and 4 co-operation among law enforcement systems. 5 I am particularly struck by -- deeply impressed by what Mr. Justice Campbell said at the very outset 6 7 of his report. 8 Virtually every interjurisdictional serial killer, including Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire 9 Ripper case, and Black, the cross border 10 11 child killer in England, Ted Bundy, the Green River Killer in the United States, and 12 Clifford Olson in Canada demonstrate the same 13 14 problems and raise the same questions, and 15 always the answer turns out to be the same systemic failure. Always the problems turn 16 17 out to be the same, the mistakes the same, 18 the systemic failures the same. 19 He goes on to say that: 20 The remarkable thing about serial predator 21 investigations is that the same problems 22 repeat themselves in every investigation with 23 tragic frequency. We seem to be incapable of 24 learning from previous experiences. 25 What happened here must not happen again. I

consider my paramount duty to do everything I can to contribute to that end within my power as commissioner. If the reviews and reports that had followed each of these serial crimes with such similar characteristics and recommendations that have failed to effect change I have concluded that I must ask myself what is this commission -- what can this commission do differently in order to make a difference? Our work must focus on doing whatever we can to make sure we make a difference in every practical term in advancing the ability to prevent these horrific crimes.

I can now say that I will address in my final report any elements of systemic failure that may have occurred here and expect that it will speak to at least the following categories of recommendations; A, a difficult interface between policing authorities and the marginalized communities of these victims, B, interjurisdictional difficulties between different police forces, and C, shortcomings in organizational systems. I wish to consider all options of how this process ought to be shaped so that I can inform and frame my recommendations in the best possible way to fulfill the duties

pursuant to my mandate within the powers vested to

me under the *Public Inquiry Act*.

I have instructed commission counsel to undertake such discussions as they consider may be helpful, including with participants, and to consult with other professionals he considers to have the appropriate background and experience to assist him in providing advice and guidance to me. I have directed commission counsel that I now wish to hear from three lead investigators in the missing women investigations. They include Detective Constable Shenher, Corporal Connor, and Inspector Don Adam. I reiterate the importance that I wish to move forward in a timely way focused in a way that is set out in this process directive, and I will be issuing further process directives in the days ahead. Thank you.

Mr. Vertlieb

19 MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. The witness that's
20 next to come before you is Professor Rossmo, and
21 the indication that I have to date would suggest
22 that he will be at least two days. I don't have
23 all the information from everyone on potential
24 time frame, but he will certainly be with us today
25 and tomorrow and can make himself available

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. Mr. Ward. 2 3 MR. WARD: Just before the witness appears, it's Cameron Ward, 4 counsel for the families of 25 murdered women. 5 I've listened to the practice directive with 6 interest, and I note that my clients have waited 7 over a decade for this inquiry into these matters, and I'm sure that this commission is committed to 8 9 fulfilling its mandate in conducting a thorough and proper inquiry as contemplated by Professor 10 11 Ratushny and others, and we certainly intend to assist the commissioner as best as we can with 12 13 that. My clients expect that the mandate will be 14 fulfilled and that there won't be any shortcuts or 15 corners cut such that for pure interest of 16 expediency. My clients deserve a complete and 17 thorough inquiry, and I'm sure Mr. Commissioner is committed to that. Those are my remarks in 18 19 respect of the directive. 20 THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Vertlieb. 21 MR. VERTLIEB: May Professor Rossmo take the stand, please. 22 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. 23 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 24 KIM ROSSMO: Sworn THE REGISTRAR: Would you state your name, please. 25

Thursday if need be.

- 1 THE WITNESS: Darcy Kim Rossmo. R-o-s-s-m-o.
- 2 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Counsel.
- 3 MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you. Now, Mr. Commissioner, Ms. McKeachie
- 4 has provided a copy of the documents that we want
- 5 to take the witness through, and I'm hoping you
- 6 have them.
- 7 THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
- 8 MR. VERTLIEB: And a copy should be available to the witness as
- 9 well so he can see what I'm referring to. Thank
- 10 you, Mr. Giles, I appreciate that.

## 11 EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. VERTLIEB:

- 12 Q Professor Rossmo, you are here to talk about your
- involvement in the actual missing women
- investigations that took place in 1998 and 1999,
- and I also want to have you go through your
- background to give the commissioner a sense of the
- 17 work that you do. Let's just discuss your police
- 18 background because that starts your career, and I
- know that your education comes in as you are going
- through your policing, so just please tell us, and
- I believe this would be tab 3, your Vancouver
- Police Department resumé. Do you have tab 3 in
- 23 front of you?
- 24 A Yes, I do.
- 25 Q Thank you. This takes us through all of the

actual positions you held with the Vancouver 1 2 Police. Let's take you through it briefly while 3 you're here with us. When did you first become a 4 member of the Vancouver Police Department? 5 I first began working for the Vancouver Police Α Department in 1978 as a civilian communications 6 7 operator, and I became a sworn constable in January 1980. 8 9 Q And you were with the Vancouver Police from January 1980 until when? 10 11 Α On December 2000. Now, we've heard much about you with your 12 Q 13 geographic profiling, but I want to just deal a 14 few minutes with your actual policing career, 15 because you have extensive police experience working on the ground. Tell us as it relates to 16 17 the work of the missing women investigations in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver about the 18 19 policing background that you think would be 20 relevant for the commissioner to know about? 21 I began my career working in what was known as Α 22 District 2, the skid road Downtown Eastside area 23 of Vancouver, where I worked both patrol and 24 walked a beat. I did two tours of duty there, the 25 first from 1980 to 1985, the second from 1989 to

1992. I spent the years between 1985 and 1989 1 2 working in the Mount Pleasant area, where in 3 addition to patrol duties I was assigned to a 4 special project for two years, the Mount Pleasant 5 Community Liaison Team, which dealt with a number 6 of community problems, many of them resulting from 7 the civil injunction that moved the street prostitution trade from Davie Street onto 8 9 Broadway. I also worked one summer on the Prostitution Task Force which had been established 10 11 in that area and did a short term assisting the Vice Squad. I spent two years in the Vancouver 12 13 Integrated Intelligence Unit which later became 14 known as CLEU intelligence, and for the last five 15 years of my career I was detective inspector in charge of the Geographic Profiling Section where 16 17 we provided investigative support to the Vancouver Police Department, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 18 19 FBI, Scotland Yard and other agencies in cases of 20 serial violent crime including serial murder and serial rape. I would also say --21 22 0 I'm sorry, let me just ask you something. In your resumé, and I'm talking still tab 3, and here 23 24 today you said that you were both patrol and beat? 25 Α Yes.

Why the distinction? Tell the commissioner what 1 2 the distinction is so he understands why you use 3 that language. 4 A patrol function is normally done in an Α 5 automobile, but there are special assignments 6 particularly in the skid road area where you would 7 walk a beat with a partner and this allowed for close interactions with the community. Rather 8

than just responding to calls you would be more proactive, you would engage with the people more, you would spend time talking to them. You spend an awful lot of time in the licensed

was a very, I think, productive and rewarding type

establishments, the bars, the rooming houses. It

of policing because you were not separated by the

metal structure of an automobile going from call

to call. You could have a much closer

interaction, learn a lot more about the community,

about its lifestyle, about the people in there.

Q So just on the subject of the community and the lifestyle and the people on there, and the

commissioner has heard from others such as

Professor Lowman, who I believe you've worked

with.

A Yes.

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And we've heard from other community members, but 1 2 give us your impression of the community in the 3 day when you worked in District 2, and 4 particularly focus on the Downtown Eastside, how 5 would you describe that community? 6 It was a very interesting and complex community. Α 7 It was an area with a lot of crime, a lot of problems, a lot of violence, a lot of disease, but 8 9 also had individuals who had lived there for years, individuals that were community activists. 10 11 It had, of course, a very thriving Chinatown, and there was also the commercial area of Gastown. It 12 was an area with a lot of problems. One thing I 13 14 noticed because of the four year gap I had between 15 working the two tours of duty in skid road, coming back was a very tragic number of people who had 16 17 died in the intervening period because of AIDS and intravenous drug use. So it was an area with 18 significant challenges, but also with a lot of 19 20 vibrancy, a lot of different types of people with different origins. There's a large proportion of 21 22 First Nations people there, and a lot of people that have come from outside of Vancouver and 23 outside of British Columbia. Some of them with 24

very interesting, but also in some cases very sad

life stories. 1 2 Interesting comment about when you came back after Q 3 four years you noticed people who were no longer there due to death. Was the community one where 4 5 you would actually come to know people in a way 6 that if somebody wasn't there you noticed they 7 were no longer there? Yes, Mr. Commissioner, especially when you were 8 Α 9 able to walk the beat you would see the same faces night after night that you were working. Many of 10 11 these people had regular habits, the same bar they would go to, even the same corner of the bar that 12 13 they would stay. And some were long term 14 residents of the rooming houses, been there for 15 20, 30 years. Others were transient. They'd come in from Eastern Canada, you might see them move 16 17 on, some of them ended up staying there. Many young people coming from the reserves. I say it 18 19 would be very wrong to characterize the skid road 20 community as one dimensional. There are many 21 different types of people with different stories, 22 different problems and different abilities. 23 But even though it has the problems of drugs and Q 24 other issues that we've heard about, it's still 25 nonetheless an active community and a community

that identifies itself as a community? 1 2 Yes, I think this is one of the reasons there was Α 3 a bit of a shift from my early days of the 4 community being known as skid road which had its 5 origins in the logging industry to the Downtown 6 Eastside. 7 Now, in your materials you mentioned your work on Q the Prostitution Task Force patrol, and also the 8 9 Mount Pleasant Community Liaison. I want to specifically discuss your knowledge and experience 10 11 dealing with the sex trade workers, because that's the focus the commissioner has been asked to deal 12 with in his inquiry. Tell us about your dealings 13 14 in that area of activity? 15 All three patrol areas I worked, a short time on Α Davie Street in 1980 back in the period when Davie 16 17 Street was very, very active with its street prostitution problem, Mount Pleasant and Broadway, 18 19 and of course the Downtown Eastside which had 20 street prostitution first of all on the edge of 21 Chinatown, but then eventually moving more into 22 the eastern part, the industrial area. So all 23 three of my patrol areas were areas with a lot of street prostitution. The community liaison 24 25 project, the Mount Pleasant Liaison Team, we

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worked with the community, we worked with various social service groups and others in relationship to some of the issues associated with street prostitution, and out of that came projects with what was originally called the Juvenile Task Force which then morphed into the Interministerial Street Children's Committee, which was dealing with juveniles that were working with the street along Broadway. And the ISCC was a joint agency effort to try to get them off the street involving probation, social services, police and mental health and some other agencies. I would also say that my master thesis supervisor was Professor John Lowman, who is one of the experts in Canada on prostitution, and I was able to learn much from him on that. I spent a short assignment in vice engaged in prostitution enforcement. And I was involved in 1991 at the request of the RCMP in what was called Project Eclipse, which was a look at 25 women who I believe 23 were engaged in the sex trade industry one way or the other who had been murdered in the Vancouver and Victoria areas, and this was an effort to look for links between these crimes to see if there were possible serial murderers that were attacking the prostitutes or

were focusing on prostitutes in the Lower Mainland 1 2 and Greater Victoria and then try to develop 3 profiles to assist in the investigation of those 4 series. And then finally in the last five years 5 of my career because I was involved with the 6 geographic profiling function many of the cases I 7 worked, serial murderer, serial sexual assault cases, the victims were prostitutes. And I worked 8 9 such cases in Canada, the United States, United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Africa and Australia. 10 11 So since we've heard about your actual working Q knowledge in the Downtown Eastside, and you've now 12 13 mentioned the serial killer expertise that you 14 have, just while you've mentioned that, is there a connection between the kind of people who would be 15 marginalized and suffering from the community 16 17 impacts as we have in the Downtown Eastside sex trade and being preyed upon by a serial killer? 18 Yes, it's very clear that marginal groups, in 19 Α 20 particular street prostitutes, are disproportionately impacted by both predators and 21 22 serial murderers. Why is that? 23 Q 24 I think there are a number of reasons. There is 25 -- for some of these offenders they are targeting

these women because of some moral outrage or 1 2 religious indignation, but I think it's more 3 likely to be the case that more of them are just 4 working from easy victims. It's many times a 5 crime of opportunity. So if you want to have a 6 woman voluntarily get into your car in an area 7 where no one is paying any attention and drive to a dark alley, well, you know, a street prostitute 8 9 is the perfect victim that way. Another reason is that the social response, the police response, the 10 11 media response is going to be much lower than if you were targeting, say, children or middle class 12 13 individuals. So I would say it's definitely a 14 function of opportunity, it's a function of 15 minimizing your risk as an offender, and in a few 16 cases anyways, some sort of specific vendetta 17 against that particular group for whatever quote 18 unquote moral reasons. Let's cover more of your background and we'll come 19 Q 20 back to your comment that I think the commissioner 21 should hear more about, the comment about the 22 media and police response. I just want to finish 23 off with the aspect of your work with the VPD. 24 The last five years you were working as a

specialist as a detective, and we'll come to that

in a moment, that comes off of the educational 1 2 stream that you started to follow. So I think we 3 could move off your police background, Professor. 4 Are you comfortable to leave it where we've left 5 it in terms of the background in your policing 6 career? 7 Yes, I am. Α Tell us, please, then how it is that you came to 8 Q 9 have the professional academic career that you've had that's led to your professorship in Texas? 10 11 Α When I joined the Vancouver Police Department I had a bachelor's degree in sociology from the 12 13 University of Saskatchewan. While I was working 14 with the Vancouver Police Department I obtained a 15 master's degree in criminology from Simon Fraser University, and then eventually pursued a PhD in 16 17 criminology also from Simon Fraser University. I did this concurrent with my police time. 18 19 When you joined the force with the bachelor's Q 20 degree in sociology, what was your impression of how many of the people in the police force would 21 22 have had a four year university degree at that time? 23 24 At that time my academy class had about 10 percent 25 of the individuals with degrees, but I would

1		suspect if you then go we were obviously the
2		newest class, so if you went back in time there
3		would be a fewer number, so maybe 5 percent just
4		as a rough estimate, but there were other people
5		with a bachelor's degree.
6	Q	Yes. Now, when you received your master's degree
7		in criminology, to your knowledge approximately
8		how many other police officers had a master's
9		degree in criminology at the time you were with
10		the VPD?
11	А	Mr. Commissioner, is the question about within the
12		Vancouver Police Department?
13	Q	Yes.
14	А	If you count all sorts of master's such as, say,
15		an MBA, I think we might have had two or three.
16	Q	You had a doctorate while you were a member of the
17		Vancouver Police Department?
18	А	Yes, I obtained a doctorate in 1996.
19	Q	And do you know if anyone else had a PhD at the
20		time that you were still in the VPD?
21	А	Not with the Vancouver Police Department, and to
22		my knowledge not with any other police
23		organization in Canada.
24	Q	Your PhD was granted in 1996 from Simon Fraser,
25		and what was your area of interest?

My dissertation was entitled Geographic profiling: 1 Α 2 Target patterns of serial murders. I worked in an 3 area called environmental criminology which is 4 concerned with how the environment influences 5 crime patterns, the spatial and temporal crime 6 patterns, which simply means why this crime 7 happened, where and when it happens. I looked at -- my data was on serial murder cases. One of the 8 9 reasons I chose that was that it was easy to 10 establish linkages between those murders. So you 11 could say the same offender, for example Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper, did these 20 12 13 crimes. And I was interested in the geography of 14 those crimes, the timing of those crimes and then 15 how it might be used to assist a criminal 16 investigation. 17 In what way could that knowledge be used to assist Q a criminal investigation? 18 It turns out that even though we are dealing with 19 Α 20 some horrendous predators they engage in behaviour 21 that is very similar to the rest of us, and with a 22 minimum number of crimes, say five or six, you can 23 establish a pattern that with the right sort of 24 computer program can be used to determine where

the offender most likely is based or where he

resides. So on average we were able to determine the home base of these offenders in the top 5 percent of the area that they were committing their crimes in.

Now, you can't solve a crime with a profile, you can only do that with physical evidence and a confession or a witness, but what you can do is prioritize your information. In a way it serves as a management tool because these criminal investigations suffer from information overload. For example, in the Yorkshire Ripper case there were over 260,000 names that the police collected during that investigation. During the Green River murder investigation, just to the south of us here, they had 18,000 names in their database. So in a way these cases often involve trying to find a needle in a haystack.

The idea of profiling, in particular geographic profiling, is to provide a focus. And one of the advantages of geographic profiling is that so many of our databases contain addresses, drivers licence, registered owner vehicle information, field interview checks that the police do, traffic tickets, various other commercial and government databases. So it's a

very powerful tool for manipulating data, and it's 1 2 now been implemented in a number of police 3 agencies and used around the world. Just on this subject tell the commissioner about 4 Q 5 how your expertise was used in Afghanistan with 6 the Dutch authorities just to give an example of 7 the breadth of what your expertise can offer. Mr. Commissioner, one of our major current 8 Α 9 projects is a large, about \$1.3 million, grant 10 with the United States Marine Corps who approached 11 us because they were interested in potential applications of geographic profiling in counter 12 13 insurgency. As one specific example, as a result 14 of training courses that we offered at Fort 15 MacDill in Florida the Royal Netherlands Military, who have a presence in Afghanistan were 16 17 experiencing attacks from the Taliban using indirect rocket fire. And I should just maybe 18 19 explain that. The rockets that they're firing at 20 their forward operating base are meant to be fired 21 from a truck, but what they do is because they 22 don't have trucks and there are no real roads in

these areas they just prop them up on some rocks

people that we had trained using the information

and then fire them towards the camp. So the

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1	about where the rockets were launched from, which
2	they can tell from counter-battery radar collected
3	I believe something like seven locations, they
4	then analyzed that using the geographic profiling
5	system. They realized that because these rockets
6	are very large and heavy, and because vehicles
7	aren't involved so there had to be some storage
8	point nearby, and the storage had to be
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
10	MR. WARD: Mr. Commissioner, I'm sorry to interrupt, but you
11	pointed out time and again time is very precious
12	in this inquiry. This is completely irrelevant.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: How do you know it's irrelevant?
14	MR. WARD: Well, it sounds irrelevant to me. I don't know what
15	happened in Afghanistan has to do with the missing
16	women of the Downtown Eastside.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Vertlieb.
18	MR. WARD: I object. It's irrelevant and it's a waste of time.
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Vertlieb.
20	MR. VERTLIEB: I just wanted you to see a sense of this
21	individual's knowledge in the field and how it's
22	applicable, and how if people think about the
23	knowledge that's available you may be able to find
24	potential serial killers more quickly. I think
25	it's just important to get a sense of the breadth

1 of what this gentleman brings to this hearing. 2 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. 3 MR. VERTLIEB: 4 0 I'm sorry for the interruption. Just tell the 5 commissioner how the geographic profiling would 6 help and assist just in a brief way. 7 The Dutch military then used the profile to Α prioritize empty wells in a dredge system which 8 9 had dried up over the course of time and they spent -- because they were able to prioritize a 10 11 small number of these wells they were able to 12 deploy special forces and they were able to 13 recover where these rockets were stored and 14 address the problem of the Talibans that were 15 firing the rockets. 16 So your expertise is sought out by agencies in Q 17 Canada, the United States and Europe? 18 Α Yes. 19 Thank you. When you were working for the VPD you Q 20 were solely contracted to the Vancouver Police, and I'm talking the years '95 to 2000? 21 22 Α Yes. 23 Thank you. Tell us -- we have your academic 0 24 resumé, I won't take you through it. You are a 25 professor at Texas State University, and you are

an endowed chair in that capacity? 1 2 That is correct. And I am the director of a Α 3 centre, the Centre for Geospatial and Intelligence 4 Investigation. 5 Okay. Let's start then, please, with your work in 0 6 the missing women investigation when you were a 7 member of the Vancouver Police Department. Can you tell the commissioner, please, the first date 8 9 that you recall performing any work on this matter? 10 11 Α It would have been towards the end of August of 1998. 12 And can you tell us, please, what the very first 13 Q 14 event was that revolves around this important work 15 we're doing here? I received a phone call from Staff Sergeant Doug 16 Α 17 McKay-Dunn, who was the second in command of District 2 which was the area that includes the 18 19 Downtown Eastside, who said there was a problem 20 they had and he wanted to talk to me about it. I believe he then came to my office that day and 21 22 told me about these reports of a large number of 23 missing women and the possibility that they might be victims of a serial murder. Because he knew of 24 25 my research background and my experience working

on serial murder cases for other agencies in the 1 2 geographic profiling section he wondered if I 3 might be able to advise them or give them some 4 thoughts on it. I believe he and I then went up 5 to speak to Inspector Gary Greer who was in charge 6 of District 2, and that day we decided that we 7 would prepare some sort of working group to take a look at the problem. 8 9 Q Now, we've asked if you had any notes about that. Is it the case that there are no notes reflecting 10 11 that phone call and those discussions with McKay-Dunn and Mr. Greer? 12 None that I know of. 13 Α And you fix that date in your memory at August 25 14 0 15 of 1998? That sounds about right. 16 Α 17 Thank you. That was the first time that you had Q been introduced to this issue of the missing women 18 19 in the Downtown Eastside? 20 Yes, Mr. Commissioner. Α 21 Thank you. Now, the first document we have, Q 22 Mr. Commissioner, is an e-mail from Lori Shenher, 23 it's tab 7 in the materials before you for your convenience, and it's August 26, 1998, 9:07 a.m. 24 25 Professor, you've seen this e-mail in the last day

as you were preparing to give evidence? 1 2 Yes, I have, Mr. Commissioner. Α And is this the first written piece of information 3 Q 4 that you have relating to the missing women of the 5 Downtown Eastside? 6 Yes, that I can remember. Α 7 Tell us what you recall then of the e-mail, how it Q came to your attention, because it appears to be 8 9 from Ms. Shenher to you? Mr. Commissioner, I don't recall it. It's 10 Α 11 something I haven't seen since -- well, for fourteen years almost, but what I vaguely recall 12 13 is contact -- sorry, let me back up, please. 14 Following my meetings with McKay-Dunn and Greer I 15 thought that our Major Crime Section, which is responsible for homicide, sex crimes and missing 16 17 persons, had to play a very key role in anything that was done. So the first think I did was phone 18 19 Inspector Fred Biddlecombe, who is in charge of 20 the MCS, Major Crime Section. He was away on 21 vacation and I spoke to Geramy Field, Sergeant 22 Geramy Field, who I believe was acting that 23 particular day in that capacity. I believe she must have told me about Lori Shenher's 24 25 involvement, and then I reached out to Constable

Shenher who responded back to me with this e-mail. 1 2 So let's just provide a bit more detail to the Q 3 commissioner about this. McKay-Dunn came to you 4 and introduced the problem. Just tell us what you 5 remember of the problem that he was discussing 6 with you that led you then to go talk to Gary 7 Greer? That they had reports through Constable Dave 8 Α 9 Dickson, but originating from the community, about the large number of women who had gone missing 10 from the Downtown Eastside, most of them sex trade 11 12 workers, and there was suggestions by the 13 community that a serial murderer might be 14 responsible and he wanted to know if this was something that I might be able to assist them 15 16 with. 17 And at that time you of course had knowledge about Q serial killers from your work and study? 18 19 Yes, that's correct. Α 20 Thank you. And when you then spoke to Gary Greer Q can you tell us as best as you recall, and we all 21 22 realize it's fourteen years ago, what the ultimate discussion was about and what it resulted in? 23 24 This was something that Inspector Greer was 25 concerned about as well, and I think to the best

of my recollection that I suggested we -- I 1 2 prepare some sort of working plan or blueprint for 3 things we could do and then submit it to them. 4 And one of the things was to develop a group that 5 could work together with representatives from key areas in the VPD and from outside of the VPD so 6 7 that we could figure the best way forward. Why did you think it was important to have groups 8 Q 9 outside the Vancouver Police be involved? One of the things that I had learned from my 10 Α 11 studies, but also it seemed from the cases I had been involved with with serial murder, is the 12 classic mistakes made in serial murder 13 14 investigations, and these are very similar of 15 course to what you were referring to earlier, Mr. Commissioner. One of the classic mistakes is 16 17 being parochial, not involving all the agencies that need to be involved in such a case. And this 18 19 is particularly problematic in an area like the 20 Lower Mainland where there are a number of different cities and a number of different police 21 22 jurisdictions involved, so it would be very easy 23 to miss important pieces of the investigative puzzle by not involving the other police agencies. 24 25 And the community groups, how would they be 0

important? 1 2 Well, the whole problem or the whole situation was a result of information that was received I 3 4 believe from our Native Indian street front office 5 on Hastings Street. I believe to the best of my 6 memory they're the ones that were speaking to 7 Constable Dickson about this problem. It's also important to realize when we step away from the 8 9 Hollywood rhetoric about detectives is that the number one group that solves crimes is the 10 11 community. In fact there's a classic study done by Rand on the investigative function and they 12 13 found that the number one group for solving crimes 14 is the community, the public, the number two group 15 were patrol officers, and the number three group were detectives. So this said that it was very 16 17 important to have good lines of communication within your agency, and good lines of 18 19 communication between your agency and other 20 agencies, and good lines of communication between 21 the police agencies and the community. 22 0 Let me just read the memo briefly and I want to ask you about that. It says: 23 24 Hi Kim, 25 Basically, I've been here a month and I'm

trying to familiarize myself with all the 1 2 files, re-interview many of the players and 3 try to find some common ground. 4 At this point, it seems two or three of these 5 women met with boyfriends or pimp types with motives to harm them, but I'm starting to 6 7 feel that the large percentage of these 8 missings are mysterious and likely either a 9 stranger or dealers they owed money to likely Viets - could be responsible. I know 10 11 that doesn't narrow it down much, but as I 12 said, I'm still getting familiar with all the files. Obviously, I'm trying to look at who 13 14 could have their act together enough to be 15 carefully disposing of bodies instead of dumping them as would seem to be more typical 16 of a skids hooker homicide. 17 I'm following up several anonymous tips as 18 19 well, but nothing substantial as yet has come 20 from those. Let me know what you've been doing on this 21 22 and maybe we can shed some light on it. 23 Thanks, Lori. Now, I wanted to ask you about the reference to 24 25 anonymous tips. Did you get any more information

about the names of people who could be in that 1 2 category? 3 No, I did not. Α 4 Did you have any information then about any Crime 0 5 Stoppers tip that had come into the police? 6 No, Mr. Commissioner. Α 7 Do you recall any more discussion with Ms. Shenher Q at that date about that e-mail that she sent to 8 9 you? No, I do not. 10 Α 11 Just curious about the evidence you mentioned to 0 the commissioner, it's interesting when you talked 12 13 about the TV shows and detectives and you said the 14 number one group that solves crime is the 15 community, and number two is the patrol officers, and number three the detectives. Do you believe 16 17 that at the time you were working in the Vancouver Police that that was generally known in the 18 19 Vancouver Police? 20 Difficult for me to say, but probably not. Α Detectives sometimes have healthy egos, and it all 21 22 depends on the individual, but we sometimes 23 forget, and maybe it's just human nature, we 24 sometimes forget those that help us or give us key 25 data or information that without that we never

1		could have solved the crime. Sorry, I
2	Q	No, please.
3	А	I just probably not.
4	Q	So going back to this e-mail, you had heard
5		nothing about the name Bill Hiscox, H-i-s-c-o-x?
6	А	Not at that time, no.
7	Q	Now, the next e-mail that we have is September 1,
8		1998, tab 8, and this is from Brian McGuinness,
9		Operations Support, to the Deputy Chief of Police
10		Operations Division. You were copied in it?
11	А	Yes, Mr. Commissioner.
12	Q	And so this is just the next e-mail in the
13		chronology. This was sent to you to keep you
14		informed that at least the interest appeared to be
15		going up the line as far as the deputy's office?
16	А	Yes.
17	Q	Now, there's a letter from you dated September 4,
18		1998, it's tab 9, Mr. Commissioner, and this is to
19		Superintendent Gary Bass. I wanted to ask you
20		about this. There's writing on there,
21		handwriting, you see that on the front page?
22	А	Yes, I do.
23	Q	That's not yours?
24	А	No, it's not.
25	Q	So tell us about this letter, why you wrote it?

I believe on the morning of September the 4th we 1 Α 2 had the first meeting of a working group looking 3 into the problem of the missing women. This was 4 one of the ideas that we would have was have this 5 working group with the individuals representing 6 different sections including the RCMP, and again 7 to the best of my recollection, as a result of that meeting we reached out to Superintendent Bass 8 9 and asked for some representative, either himself or someone from his section, to be a member of the 10 11 working group. One of the concerns that we had is because the RCMP covers a very large part of the 12 13 Lower Mainland, especially the areas that are less 14 urbanized, that bodies might be found in areas 15 that were their jurisdiction. Tell us about the working group that led to you 16 Q 17 writing to the superintendent. Who chaired and who was a member and why was it organized? 18 It was co-chaired by Inspector Greer and myself, 19 Α 20 and the purpose of it is probably best explained in a blueprint that I wrote that outlined what we 21 22 hoped to accomplish with the working group, which 23 in this particular letter you can see a 24 simplification of that mandate, basically to

develop lists of possible victims from both the

list of missing women, but also from street 1 2 prostitutes that had been attacked or murdered, 3 establish linkages of those lists and then make up 4 follow-up investigative recommendations. In other 5 words, if appropriate what should be done in terms 6 of investigating these as a possible serial murder 7 case. Since you've mentioned it perhaps the best way for 8 Q 9 the commissioner to deal with your blueprint, let's just turn, Mr. Commissioner, to tab 12 for 10 11 your convenience, and for my colleagues it's in 12 LePard's documents Volume 1, and it's tab 4 of binder 3. This is -- do you have a copy of that, 13 14 Professor? 15 Yes, I do, Mr. Commissioner. I point out there's Α two versions, an updated one is at tab 13, but 16 there's not much difference between them. 17 The difference as I understand it is that the 18 Q 19 criteria in your first blueprint was using the 20 time frame 1980 to '98? That's correct. 21 Α And then it shifted to 1970 to 1998? 22 0 That is correct. And also with the revised 23 edition we wanted to also include serious sexual 24 25 assault victims as well.

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So just looking at the blueprint, and the
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 2
                   commissioner has it in front of him, there's
 3
                   handwriting on there and --
 4
      THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
 5
                   Mr. Commissioner, I apologize for interrupting.
      MS. TOBIAS:
 6
                   Cheryl Tobias for the Government of Canada.
 7
                   not making an objection, but I'm looking around at
                   my learned friends here and I think we're all a
 8
9
                   bit confused as to precisely which document
                   Mr. Vertlieb is referring to. I think there may
10
11
                   have been some mix-up a little bit in what we got,
12
                   so I wonder if we could just clarify that before
13
                   we proceed.
14
      MR. VERTLIEB: I'll give you the number. It's VPD document
15
                   006-009663.
      THE COMMISSIONER: That's at tab 12?
16
17
      MR. VERTLIEB: That's your tab 12 for your convenience. It's
18
                   been filed in the LePard documents. And we took
19
                   Deputy LePard to this document, so it's been dealt
20
                   with before.
      MR. WARD: It's just impossible for counsel to follow.
21
22
                   don't have copies of these handy and they don't
                   match with what you provided us with this morning
23
                   I'm afraid.
24
25
      MR. VERTLIEB: Well --
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- 1 MR. HIRA: It's tab 10 if anybody --
- 2 MR. VERTLIEB: I'm looking at the document, and we've covered
- it before with Deputy LePard, it's not new.
- 4 MR. HIRA: It's tab 10 of the documents.
- 5 MR. VERTLIEB: I've given them the number and I've told people
- 6 where it was in the LePard Volume 1, and I don't
- 7 know what else I can do. Let me just carry on
- 8 orally and people can follow. It's not a new
- 9 concept this blueprint, because it ultimately
- 10 wasn't as you know --
- 11 THE COMMISSIONER: These documents have already been provided?
- MR. VERTLIEB: Absolutely.
- 13 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
- 14 MR. VERTLIEB: So let me just continue on if I may.
- 15 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
- 16 MR. VERTLIEB:
- 17 Q Professor Rossmo, this blueprint, who prepared it?
- 18 A I did.
- 19 Q I won't take you through it in detail, but it's
- called a Strategic Blueprint, it was a result of
- 21 the work that you did with the Missing Women
- Working Group in early September of 1998. So who
- 23 all participated in that working group? You
- 24 mentioned yourself and Greer as co-chairs.
- 25 A We had representatives from major crime, including

missing persons Lori Shenher, Sergeant Geramy 1 2 Field from I believe homicide, Axel Hovbrender, 3 the sergeant from Sexual Offence Squad. We had 4 individuals representing the DISC program which 5 tracked the customers of street prostitutes in 6 Vancouver, and we had representation from the 7 RCMP, in particular from the valley where they had three bodies that were murders of prostitutes that 8 9 had worked in the Downtown Eastside from Vancouver, the Pipe, Younker, I'm not sure if I'm 10 11 pronouncing it correctly, Olajide, and there may have been others as well. There is a mailing list 12 13 that was prepared for the working group which 14 would list everybody. 15 So this strategic blueprint was put together by Q 16 you. What was its purpose? 17 I'm sorry, Mr. Commissioner, there was also Α representation from patrol District 2, Gary Greer 18 19 obviously, and Dave Dickson. And, I'm sorry, 20 could you please repeat the question. 21 What was the purpose of the blueprint that you Q 22 prepared? The purpose was to determine if these reports of 23 Α 24 missing women represented a crime problem. 25 other words, were these victims. And what we

thought we would do with this is to first develop 1 2 a list of potential victims, including missing, 3 sexual assault and homicide victims, then try to determine which of these may be linked together 4 5 and, in other words, connected to the same 6 offender, and then third, make recommendations for 7 further investigation. This would actually involve the working group being dissolved and we 8 9 would make recommendations regarding what, if any, interagency nature of the investigation was 10 11 appropriate. And I note here we also say formation of a task force if the findings warrant 12 13 it. And I think it's also important to point out 14 that there's elements here of this plan which 15 involved a proactive investigation and also safety and crime prevention initiatives. 16 17 Let's just talk about those two issues, the Q proactive and the safety and crime initiatives. 18 Tell us about the proactive. What do you mean by 19 20 that, and what did you think might be implemented as you developed more knowledge? 21 22 Α Well, we could be doing -- parallel with the assessment of the missing women and sexual assault 23 24 and murder victims analysis we could be collecting 25 information on possible suspects. So if we look

at the first part, Mr. Commissioner, as being 1 2 victim focused, the second part is more offender 3 focused, looking at likely sources of information 4 for individuals who could be responsible if it did 5 turn out that we thought a serial predator was 6 operating. So these include the bad trick list 7 that were prepared, the DSTC or the DISC program which I just mentioned which had data on johns. 8 Of course field checks in the relevant areas of 9 Vancouver done by patrol officers, maybe setting 10 11 up surveillance, talking to community groups, and any sort of profiling analytic products that might 12 13 be prepared. 14 And how would you describe the meeting, did it 0 15 meet the objectives that you hoped for going into the meeting? 16 17 The meeting on that day was very good. There was Α a lot of interest, a lot of co-operation expressed 18 19 from everybody. I would describe it as very 20 positive. And the result was the letter to Superintendent 21 Q 22 Gary Bass which is before the commissioner and 23 everyone? 24 Correct. Α 25 You realize that you would likely need 0

1		interjurisdictional assistance?
2	А	The odds were very good that it would not be
3		limited just to the City of Vancouver.
4	Q	Now, the working group then when it first met took
5		place and Biddlecombe was not there?
6	А	Correct. I believe he was still on vacation.
7	Q	Do you remember who stood in for Fred Biddlecombe?
8	А	Perhaps Sergeant Field. I know that she was in
9		attendance, I know that she worked for major
10		crime, and because she's the one I had spoken to
11		on the phone that was my supposition.
12	Q	Now, the next correspondence is a letter from Fred
13		Biddlecombe, September 14, 1998. This is in
14		LePard documents Volume 1, it's tab 11, Phase 2.
15		And this is from Biddlecombe to Gary Greer. You
16		did not see this at the time, is that
17	А	I did not see this document until this month.
18	Q	And you saw it when it was put to you in
19		preparation to give evidence to the commissioner?
20	А	Yes, I believe I first saw this on Sunday.
21	Q	Now, in that letter at the first paragraph there's
22		discussion about a draft news release. Did you
23		do you have knowledge about a draft news release?
24	А	Yes, I do.
25	Q	We've seen that earlier in the proceedings. If

you look at tab 10, Mr. Commissioner, you'll see a copy for your convenience. Who prepared that draft news release?

A I did.

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- Q And why did you prepare it?
  - Numerous reasons. One, to inform the public of what we were doing. Two, one of the common mistakes repeated over and over again by police agencies with serial murder investigations is the initial denial that there is a serial murderer, which inevitably ends up resulting in a lot of negatives for the police agency both with the community and with the media. I thought the best way to deal with that was just to be upfront, say that we had these concerns brought to our attention, we were treating these concerns seriously, we were going to investigate them and see what we could find out about the possibility of a serial murderer preying upon people in the Downtown Eastside. I mentioned before that the reality is that these crimes are more likely to be solved by a member of the public, and we also have to communicate with the individuals in our own agencies as well, and the media sometimes is an effective mechanism for doing that. The final is

that there is a duty to warn the public regarding 1 2 potential threats. It's not our job or our --3 it's not our right to not warn people about potential risks. I had some knowledge of this 4 5 from some involvement of the case in Ontario, Jane 6 Doe v. The Metropolitan Toronto Police, where the 7 police were criticized by Justice MacFarland for not warning the community about a serial rapist 8 9 operating in that city, and I thought that it was incumbent upon us even though we didn't know 10 11 exactly what was happening to say that these 12 concerns have been brought to our attention and 13 people should be aware of them. So for those four 14 reasons. 15 You mentioned denial and you related it to serial Q murder killings. Tell us about denial. Why would 16 17 that be a factor, from your study and knowledge why would that come into it? 18 19 No police agency wants to have a serial murder Α 20 case. It creates a lot of problems, it creates 21 political pressure, it generates media interests, 22 it might raise levels of community fear, it 23 requires them to respond with a suitable level of 24 resources when maybe they'd rather be doing 25 something else with their resources. In some

cases I'm aware of the political reaction has been 1 huge. And in the United States where there are 2 3 places where the political influence on the police 4 departments is much greater than in the United 5 States I've even been aware of instances where the 6 mayor has told the police chief we do not have a 7 serial murder case even when it's clearly obvious they do. So it is difficult and one of the most 8 9 challenging types of police investigations, and 10 police departments don't want one, and 11 historically many have responded by denying the existence of something they don't want. 12 13 So these were mistakes that had been made in other 0 police agencies in other countries? 14 15 Time and again. Α I'd like to finish with the draft press release. 16 0 17 It's a draft that never went out we understand that to be the case. Is that your understanding 18 19 as well? 20 That is correct. It was prepared for -- as a Α 21 draft. The particular copy in the binder has my writing on it where I'm asking Gary Greer for any 22 23 comments or suggestions. It was also given to 24 Anne Drennan, our media liaison officer, and was 25 shared with the committee members. And the plan,

I think, was to release it on September the 30th, 1 2 1998 following the meeting that we had at the end 3 of September where everyone would have their final 4 opportunity to make any comments or suggestions. 5 So this draft was available on the 4th of 0 6 September when the working group met? 7 Α Correct. And the working group seemed to be completely in 8 Q favour of this? 9 Actually I can't tell if this was written after 10 Α 11 the meeting or before. It was available for the 12 meeting at the end of September, but I'm not sure 13 if it was available for the very first meeting at 14 the start of September. Fair enough. But the idea of a news release, had 15 Q that been discussed with the working group? 16 17 Yes. Most likely what happened was, I believe Α that meeting was in the morning, most likely I 18 19 prepared this following the meeting and then sent 20 it out for feedback. I'd like to finish the discussion around the 21 Q 22 release. So let me ask you looking at the letter of September 14, 1998, Biddlecombe to Greer, 23 you've already told us you did not see it until 24 25 very recently, did Mr. Biddlecombe ever discuss

1	with you his comments or opinion that is expressed
2	in the last sentence, first paragraph:
3	I found it to be inaccurate and quite
4	inflammatory.
5	A He did make he made those statements during the
6	second and final meeting of the working group at
7	the end of September, but not by written
8	communication with me or e-mail before that.
9	MR. VERTLIEB: I've finished with the press release issue.
10	Maybe this is a convenient time to break 'cause
11	I'll then come back to the meeting and continue on
12	with the evidence.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
10	THE COLLEGE THE LIGHT.
14	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.
14	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.
14 15	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)
14 15 16	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)
14 15 16 17	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.
14 15 16 17 18	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.  MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
14 15 16 17 18 19	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.  MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.  Q So we've dealt with the press release and the
14 15 16 17 18 19	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.  MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.  Q So we've dealt with the press release and the reasons you wanted to do it. Let's move to that
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.  MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.  Q So we've dealt with the press release and the reasons you wanted to do it. Let's move to that meeting then that took place September 22, 1998,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for 15 minutes.  (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:22 A.M.)  (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:40 A.M.)  THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.  MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.  Q So we've dealt with the press release and the reasons you wanted to do it. Let's move to that meeting then that took place September 22, 1998, and this was a meeting of the group. Tell us from

from the first meeting were there. I specifically 1 2 recall Geramy Field, Lori Shenher, the two RCMP 3 officers from the valley, Dave Dickson, Gary 4 Greer, myself, possibly Doug McKay-Dunn, but I'm 5 not certain, and there may have been others, but 6 Inspector Fred Biddlecombe also showed up, which I 7 was surprised at because I didn't realize he was back from holidays. I had anticipated that he 8 9 would contact me to talk about this when he did return, but instead he just showed up at the 10 11 meeting. How long was the meeting approximately? 12 Q 13 I think approximately an hour and a bit. Α And where did it take place? 14 0 15 A boardroom at 312 Main Street, the old police Α 16 headquarters. 17 And the purpose? Q It was the second meeting of the working group. 18 Α 19 So tell us about the interaction that you noticed Q 20 between Mr. Greer and Mr. Biddlecombe, and how would you describe that? 21 22 Α Well, even though this was a committee that was 23 co-chaired by Inspector Greer and myself Inspector 24 Biddlecombe effectively took over the meeting. He 25 was upset and angry and had what I have described

as a small temper tantrum. He didn't believe 1 2 there was a serial murderer, he didn't like what 3 we were doing, he was upset about the draft press 4 release, and then he began to accuse Constable 5 Dickson and myself of releasing information to the 6 I told him that was just silly, 'cause I media. 7 hadn't been given any information to leak to the media. I thought it was a very unreasonable 8 9 behaviour on his part, and more than a little embarrassing considering we had people from an 10 11 outside force. I expected Inspector Greer, who is in charge of the area of the city where these 12 13 women had gone missing from had really initiated 14 the bringing of the problem to the attention of 15 the police department at a managerial level to have responded back, stood up to, rebutted 16 17 Inspector Biddlecombe, but he didn't. I characterize what he did was -- to others as being 18 folding like a house of cards. 19 20 Tell us about Fred Biddlecombe, you knew him, Q worked with him, in terms of where he came from 21 22 from your perspective? I didn't really know him, didn't work for him or 23 Α 24 with him. This may have been the first actual 25 physical meeting together we had had. He had a

background -- I knew that he had worked as a 1 2 sergeant in the West End and that he had been a 3 detective in fraud, a staff sergeant at one time 4 in major crime which is an administrative 5 position, and now I think beginning in early 1998 6 had become the inspector in charge of major crime. 7 I'm sorry, did you want my observations of him? Well, in terms of the attitude, the comments that 8 Q 9 he'd made, he didn't seem to you to be accepting your view of what should be done. Is that a fair 10 11 way to put it? That's correct. I found him to be arrogant and 12 Α 13 somewhat egotistical. He was not interested in a 14 discussion or communication. He was angry, and I 15 thought unreasonable, for example accusing me of releasing information that I never had. It was 16 17 clear that he didn't want to deal with this issue, didn't like what we were doing, didn't want to 18 19 work with us. And in effect his reaction given 20 his position, which is the officer in charge of homicide, sex crimes, missing persons basically 21 22 killed the working group. There was no way we would continue without his full co-operation. 23 24 This is why he was the very first person I 25 contacted after my initial meeting with Greer.

So just thinking about that comment that you just 1 0 2 made and looking back on your experience now over 3 the last 14 years as you continued as a police officer and then became active in the teaching and 4 5 instruction dealing with systemic issues, do you 6 have any sense though of how -- when you have a 7 disagreement between differing groups how that should be resolved if the system is to work 8 9 properly? Yes, it requires sharing of all the relevant 10 Α 11 information, communication, co-operation towards 12 stated objectives that you all agree with, debate, 13 professional and reasoned argument. It does not 14 require throwing your weight around, being 15 aggressive, losing your temper, making threats. Who was the person who would be the superior over 16 Q Mr. Biddlecombe? 17 That would be Deputy Chief Constable Brian 18 Α 19 McGuinness who was in charge of -- I'm not sure 20 what he -- they keep changing the names in the different parts of the VPD, but I would think of 21 22 it as the investigation bureau. 23 Was there any discussion that suggested to you Q 24 Mr. McGuinness would get involved given the 25 differing opinions between lower ranking officers?

Discussion, sorry, between? 1 Α 2 With Mr. McGuinness to resolve what was obviously a differing view from Mr. Biddlecombe's view to 3 4 the rest of the group that had its own view about 5 how to proceed. Did you sense that Mr. McGuinness 6 was going to get involved? 7 No, I did not. Α You've been critical of Mr. Biddlecombe in your 8 Q 9 comments here. Do you believe he was intentionally being indifferent to these -- the 10 11 potential plight of women being taken from the Downtown Eastside? 12 13 I have no reason to believe that, Α 14 Mr. Commissioner. I don't care much for 15 Mr. Biddlecombe, but I would say that my opinion was he honestly believed there was no serial 16 17 murderer and that we were just wasting his and his people's time, and I think he made his mind up and 18 19 then very little was going to change his mind, but 20 I do think that's what he believed. So you believe it was an honestly held belief on 21 Q 22 his part? I don't think it was a well-founded belief, but I 23 Α 24 don't see, you know, anything beyond that. 25 And you've considered whether there was any issue 0

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around what you would call an intentional act on
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                   his part that you thought was not well founded?
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      MR. WARD: Excuse me. Cameron Ward, counsel for the 25 missing
                   women. This witness cannot possibly know what was
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                   in Biddlecombe's mind, only Biddlecombe can. I
 6
                   object to the question and asking this witness to
 7
                   speculate what's in --
      THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Mr. Vertlieb?
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      MR. VERTLIEB: Well, Professor Rossmo was there and listened to
                   the discussions. He already told us it was his
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11
                   honestly held belief. I want to explore that.
      MR. WARD: With respect he didn't say that, he didn't say it
12
                   was an honestly held belief. And with respect he
13
14
                   cannot say what was in Biddlecombe's mind.
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                   Biddlecombe is on the witness list, he can tell
16
                   us.
      THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think he can give an opinion as to
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                   whether or not from his knowledge of Biddlecombe
18
                   whether -- whether he feels that he honestly
19
20
                   believed what he was -- that there was no serial
21
                   killer. It may go to weight, and you can
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                   cross-examine him if you want, and you can
                   cross-examine Biddlecombe if you want. All right.
23
      MR. VERTLIEB: Perhaps I misunderstood.
24
25
                   I thought your evidence was that you thought
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Mr. Biddlecombe had the honest belief that there 1 2 was no serial killer. THE COMMISSIONER: That was his evidence. 3 4 MR. VERTLIEB: That's what I thought. 5 THE COMMISSIONER: He said I didn't like him, but he honestly 6 believed there was no serial killer, it was not a 7 well-founded belief. That's what he said. MR. VERTLIEB: 8 9 Q Was there any discussion at that meeting about Mr. Hiscox who had been a person providing a tip 10 11 to Crime Stoppers? No, there was not, but I'm just wondering if I 12 Α 13 might elaborate on the question that you were asking before. 14 15 Please, of course you may. Q 16 Α Despite the many criticisms I might have of 17 Inspector Biddlecombe, I never saw any evidence of a negative attitude towards the group. I think 18 19 it's also important to understand that one thing 20 police officers like to do is to catch bad guys, 21 and to have a -- and to apprehend a serial 22 murderer is, you know, a really significant 23 challenge and one that would be very good for a police officer's career, so I think that if 24 25 Inspector Biddlecombe did think there was a serial

murderer he would have been very interested in 1 2 pursuing it. 3 The other thing I would like to say, at least 4 within the Vancouver Police Department, the 5 attitudes held by the managerial rank, inspectors, 6 deputies and the executive percolate down through 7 the ranks, and I think in the case of Inspector Biddlecombe's attitude towards me that's something 8 9 that I suffered from. However, Inspector Biddlecombe was the individual that set up Project 10 11 Amelia, and the individuals who worked the Project Amelia I thought were very dedicated, very 12 13 compassionate toward the victims, very interested 14 in their plight, and I think if Inspector 15 Biddlecombe had negative attitudes that would have 16 found its way into the attitudes of Project 17 Amelia. Thank you. Project Amelia was the Missing Women 18 Q 19 Review Team? 20 Correct. Α 21 Organized by the Vancouver Police Department? Q 22 Α Correct. So just tell us about the result of the meeting on 23 0 September 22, 1998. You told us about who was 24 25 there and how it unfolded. By the end of the

meeting where was the working group at? 1 2 This effectively killed the working group. Α 3 Inspector Biddlecombe made it clear that he had 4 his own plan, which was the assignment of 5 Detective Constable Lori Shenher from missing 6 persons to find the missing women. This at least 7 dovetailed with one of the objectives of the working group, and I guess you might call it a bit 8 9 of a consolation, that at least something was happening. And so that's where the investigation 10 11 shifted to was the work then of Ms. Shenher, but 12 the working group was now effectively over with. So it was left that Ms. Shenher would keep working 13 0 14 to try to find these women? 15 Correct. I believe the -- the belief held by Α Inspector Biddlecombe was that the women would be 16 17 found, because there was a previous group of missing people from 1997 that Dave Dickson had 18 19 prepared and those individuals had been found. 20 So that was the end of your work on the working Q group in the year 1998, the month of September? 21 22 Α Yes, but I did my best to provide assistance where and when I could, and have some involvement even 23 24 though I would say that the relationship between 25 Inspector Biddlecombe and myself was not good

after this meeting. 1 2 I want to come to that, because there's an e-mail 0 3 from you October 8, 1998 to Sandy Cameron. And 4 this is your -- before you, Mr. Commissioner, is 5 tab 15 in the book that we've given you for your convenience. It's VPD document 001-002100. Now, 6 7 this is a memo from you to Sandy Cameron, and there's originally a memo from Sandy Cameron to 8 9 you October -- and then a memo from her October 7th. You're familiar with these two e-mails? 10 Yes, I am. 11 Α Can you just tell us about this time frame and the 12 Q 13 work you were doing? 14 Well, even though my relationship with Inspector Α 15 Biddlecombe was poor my relationship with Detective Constable Shenher was good, and one of 16 17 the things that it was decided that I could do was some sort of analysis of the missing women, but I 18 19 was trying to obtain data to assist me in that, 20 and the e-mail from Sandy Cameron of October the 7th references that. 21 22 Can you read that to us, please? Q 23 Α Kim, 24 Geramy gave me your memo where you want 25 statistics on missing persons. I am

1		attempting to gather that information for
2		you. Please be advised that this will only
3		be a list of all adults reported missing
4		throughout the City of Vancouver since 1980,
5		not just the Downtown Eastside and not just
6		prostitutes. The numbers will be up in the
7		12 to 15,000 range I think. Of that we
8		usually average eight to ten cases a year not
9		resolved, some years only four to five.
10		Vicki Yip in information is looking into this
11		as well as the annual reports for missing
12		persons for 1988, '89 and.
13	A	nd then there's a period. Then it says:
14		80 can't be located in my office.
15		Is there a certain date you need or want this
16		by?
17		Sandra Cameron
18		Missing Persons
19	A	nd then her phone number.
20	Q N	ow, Sandy Cameron worked at the Missing Persons
21	U	nit. Did you know about of her at the time?
22	А У	es.
23	Q A	nd she was non-police, she was civilian?
24	A S	he was non-sworn, she was a civilian.
25	Q S	hould she have been doing that job from your

appreciation of the situation? 1 2 Sandy -- Sandra Cameron was a clerical worker I Α 3 believe was her designation, so inappropriate to 4 assign such an individual to anything with an 5 investigative function which requires specialized 6 training and also some experience. So I remember 7 thinking, and the general thoughts of other individuals in the VPD at that time, that it was 8 9 an unusual appointment. Did you get more information in 1998 concerning 10 0 11 the missing women in the Downtown Eastside? No, I was somewhat frustrated by my efforts to 12 Α 13 obtain any data or information, and in my annual 14 report which I prepared for Deputy McGuinness at 15 the end of '98 I note that I was still waiting for information on that case. 16 17 Had you heard of Mr. Hiscox as at the end of 1998 Q with any information he might have had on 18 19 Mr. Pickton? 20 No. Α 21 Do you have any reason why that was the case, do Q 22 you know why? 23 I would guess that Detective Constable Shenher's Α 24 mandate was to find the missing persons initially, and so the focus in the first few months in her 25

work was on this list of missing people who could 1 2 be found. I know she also was collecting more 3 instances of missing persons as a result of her 4 investigation and research. So my guess would be 5 that it was 'cause her focus was on the missing 6 people, not on any suspects at that time. I also 7 think that any suspect-based investigation would require a level of resources, you know, much 8 9 beyond one detective constable. So we've concluded with the involvement of you up 10 0 11 to the end of the year 1998; correct? 12 Α Yes. 13 Thank you. Let's turn then to the early part of 0 14 1999. We have seen e-mails between you and Brian 15 McGuinness. For your reference tab 15, Mr. Commissioner. So tell us about the early part 16 17 of 1999. We see an e-mail, just so you know, Professor Rossmo, from you February 9, 1999 to 18 19 Brian McGuinness. Do you have that in your 20 material? 21 Yes, I do. Α 22 0 Can you just tell us about why you sent that e-mail? Tell us what happened that resulted in 23 24 you sending that e-mail. 25 There was a meeting at the Carnegie Centre at Main Α

1		and Hastings in Vancouver. Detective Constable
2		Shenher and myself were both in attendance at that
3		meeting with the community about the problem of
4		the missing women, and she presented the results
5		of some of her work. And this was the first time
6		I had seen this, and I recognized it as being
7		useful data for what I wanted to do, so I obtained
8		that information from her and I prepared a graph
9		which you can see on page VPD-001-002098.
10	Q	That's the third page, Mr. Commissioner. Just one
11		second while the commissioner gets that. So just
12		to give the commissioner the context, this meeting
13		was at the Carnegie Centre, that's Main and
14		Hastings?
15	А	Correct.
16	Q	And approximately how long was that meeting?
17	А	I can't recall. Sorry.
18	Q	But it was with police from Vancouver?
19	А	Correct.
20	Q	And certain people from the community?
21	А	Yes, that's right.
22	Q	Do you recall why it was that you were there at
23		that meeting?
24	A	No, not specifically, other than perhaps one
25		possibility is Lori Shenher invited me. I

obviously was still interested in this case, and 1 it was either out of interest or to support her or 2 3 to answer questions. I'm just not sure. I can't 4 remember. 5 And you learned information there that you hadn't 0 6 been given before? 7 That's correct. Α And that's why you said in your e-mail to Brian 8 Q 9 McGuinness I've never seen any reports from Major Crime Section, the numbers copied down show a 10 11 dramatic increase in 1997 and 1998, and you say I've included a graph showing the rise? 12 13 That's right. Α And that graph does as prepared by you? 14 0 15 Yes, I prepared that graph. I should also say Α this data was revised a little bit as Lori Shenher 16 17 found some missing people or found some additional cases, but the general pattern in the graph never 18 19 changed. 20 So why did you write to Brian McGuinness after you Q had heard this information for the first time, 21 22 what was your purpose? 23 Well, if you look at the graph we can see from the Α 24 years 1978 to 1994 that there's either no or one, 25 and at the most two cases of people who were

1		reported missing from the Downtown Eastside that
2		had not been found. So you can sort of consider
3		this the base rate of the typical level of
4		activity in the area, but we hit 1995, and
5		especially the years '97 and '98, the numbers jump
6		and they jump dramatically.
7	Q	When did you prepare this analysis?
8	А	Well, given the fact that my e-mail's February the
9		9th, and I'm not sure the exact date of the
10		meeting at the Carnegie Centre, but it would have
11		been in between those two dates, so sometime in
12		February.
13	Q	Now, there's more e-mails. You sent an e-mail on
14		February 10, the next day?
15	А	I'm sorry, Mr. Commissioner, on tab 14 it says the
16		meeting was February the 9th, so I prepared it
17		February the 9th.
18	Q	Thank you. The next day you sent another e-mail
19		to Brian McGuinness. Do you see that?
20		Brian,
21		I have now confirmed the numbers with Lori
22		Shenher. The attached draft breaks down the
23		number of reported missing persons from the
24		Downtown Eastside that fall into the category
25		of concern and should replace the draft

version sent to you yesterday. 1 Yes, I see that. 2 Α 3 The category of concern, what do you mean by those Q 4 words? 5 Unfound missing persons from the Vancouver Α 6 Downtown Eastside. 7 Brian McGuinness has answered e-mails. We have Q one from February 13, 11:07? 8 9 Α Yes. And another one the same date at eleven in the 10 0 11 morning, 11:11. Did Mr. McGuinness seem to take 12 your comments to heart and to show concern about 13 what you were indicating? 14 Yes, he did. Α 15 Do you know why you weren't getting that Q information sooner? 16 17 I can't say for certain, but I can say that after Α the meeting in which Inspector Biddlecombe got 18 19 upset I received no communication from him in any 20 form, no phone calls, no e-mails, nothing. other words, major crime had sort of dried up 21 22 other than whatever personal relationships I had, 23 say, with Lori Shenher. It may also have been it was difficult for Ms. Cameron to compile this 24 25 information. I'm just not certain, but it is very

safe to say that the level of 1 2 communication/co-operation with major crime was 3 not at all good. 4 Now, let's talk about the events at around the Q 5 time of these e-mails between yourself and Brian McGuinness and others. He has sent e-mails in the 6 7 chain to Fred Biddlecombe and Dan Dureau and Brock Giles. So these are all people in the VPD that 8 9 are being e-mailed about the concern of the missing women? 10 11 Α Yes, they all worked major crime at the time. So when Brian McGuinness in his e-mail to you 12 Q 13 wanted to know what kind -- he says this in his 14 e-mail: What kind of problem do we have. We need to 15 discuss the implications of this increase in 16 17 missing females in the Downtown Eastside. Do 18 we have a problem that we are not addressing 19 etc.? 20 So what resulted from that concern expressed by a 21 deputy chief? 22 Α I don't know what happened on the major crime side, but I do know that there was a meeting at 23 the end of February, I guess it would be the 24th 24 25 of February, in Brian's office which involved

Inspector Biddlecombe, Sergeant Geramy Field, 1 2 Deputy McGuinness and myself. 3 Now, we've been unable to find any minutes of that Q 4 meeting. You, I understand, have been asked as 5 well and have no minutes of that February 24 6 meeting? 7 Α No. Tell us about the meeting, what resulted? 8 Q 9 Α The meeting was somewhat strange in that Inspector Biddlecombe acted like I was not even present. He 10 11 didn't talk to me, didn't speak to me directly. 12 It was like I was not in the room. He said to 13 Deputy McGuinness in reference to my -- the chart 14 I had prepared, and he says: Look it, the only 15 reason we have this bulge in the number of unfound missing women in Rossmo's chart is that we haven't 16 17 had time to find these people. Give us a couple of years, we'll find them and that bulge will 18 19 flatten out, it will disappear. And I think he 20 almost convinced Deputy McGuinness to shut down the effort and the work of Shenher and just to 21 22 move on completely from this project. I suggested to Deputy McGuinness, I said: Well, that might be 23 the case, but why don't we get some data and let's 24

find out how long missing people stay missing. We

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should be able to get such data from the Canadian 1 2 Police Information Centre, CPIC, and then we can 3 see, you know, how likely that is and then we'll 4 know whether or not this really is a problem or if 5 it's not a problem. And Deputy McGuinness agreed 6 with that approach. So I left the meeting with 7 that particular task to accomplish. I can tell you that I strongly got the sense that Inspector 8 9 Biddlecombe was very angry at me for keeping this thing still alive, something that he thought he 10 11 had wrapped up but still was not yet going away. So tell us then about the work you did on the 12 Q 13 question you posed. And I take it your question 14 about let's test that is a way of testing people's 15 assumptions? Correct. I wanted to know what the survival rate 16 Α 17 was of a missing person. By survival rate I mean how long does a missing person stay missing before 18 19 they're found. And by obtaining CPIC data we 20 could look at the date someone was reported 21 missing, then the date someone was found and then figure out a curve for that. And so that was my 22 task. I contacted CPIC, it took some weeks to get 23 24 the data, but eventually it arrived, and at that 25 point I concluded my analyses and I prepared a

final report, a case assessment for the Downtown 1 2 Eastside missing women. 3 Now, that case assessment was dealt with in Deputy Q 4 LePard's evidence in Phase 3, tab 28. Before we 5 get to the case assessment I just want to deal 6 with a couple of e-mails. There's a new one that 7 people would not have seen that we just saw yesterday, Mr. Commissioner. It's an e-mail from 8 9 Axel Hovbrender, May 14, 1999. It's the only new document that I understand we have. And this was 10 11 an e-mail to you May 14, 1999 at 3:10. Can you just read that out, please? 12 Kim: I was very impressed in your discussion 13 Α 14 in relation to the missing persons. I 15 thought that you were able to synthesize all of our concerns into a compelling and formal 16 17 presentation. My biggest concern however is that we will not provide adequate resources 18 19 to conduct this investigation properly. But 20 I have always said that and it continues to fall on deaf ears. 21 22 Speaking of deaf ears please find attached my 23 comments in relation to the sex offender 24 registry. I will be sending it through the 25 "chain" but wanted you to have a look at it

1		uncensored. I am away all next week on a
2		conference in Regina but look forward to
3		hearing from you soon.
4	Q	Mr. Hovbrender was a sergeant in charge of Sexual
5		Offence Squad?
6	A	Yes. And he had been at least at the second of
7		the Downtown Eastside working group meetings.
8	Q	You mentioned him earlier. And so do you recall
9		what it was about this discussion in relation to
10		the missing persons? He references it in the
11		first sentence. Do you remember what that was?
12	A	At one p.m. on May 13th, 1999 a brainstorming
13		session was held at the boardroom in 312 Main
14		Street by Sergeant Geramy Field in relationship to
15		the missing women situation.
16	Q	That document's in the Concordance. For your
17		convenience it's at tab 17, Mr. Commissioner. And
18		this references a one page typed document, it's
19		dated May 19, referencing a meeting May 13 at 312
20		Main Street?
21	A	Correct.
22	Q	Do you recall approximately how long that May 13
23		meeting lasted?
24	А	I'd say at least a couple of hours, but I looked
25		at my day-timer for 1999 and I had written in one

	p.m. as the start time, I note that these notes
	say 4:10 p.m. on May 19th, which was I guess just
	when they were prepared, but given the number of
	people and given the topics I think a minimum of
	two hours, and possibly longer.
Q	So let's just go through some of that.
	Representation from DISC. You mentioned that
	earlier, D-I-S-C.
А	Yes.
Q	That was a group relating to the customers?
A	Yes, it was I believe a program in a database that
	had been started to track some of the problem
	johns that were frequenting the street
	prostitution trade.
Q	And vice, that's from Vancouver?
A	Yes.
Q	RCMP Burnaby?
А	Correct.
Q	We had criminal profiling, and that would be
	Mr. Davidson?
A	It would be.
Q	Thank you.
А	I'm just looking for his name on the list. Oh
	there he is, yes.
	A Q A Q A Q

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And SOS?
3	А	Sexual Offence Squad, yes.
4	Q	So the meeting intro by Sergeant Field and then an
5		overview by Lori. That would be Lori Shenher?
6	А	Correct.
7	Q	And these discussions:
8		Suggestions re publicizing the photos
9		commercially on bill boards by sponsors.
10		Photos of whom, sir?
11	А	The missing women.
12	Q	Okay.
13	А	Maybe I should say that at this point Detective
14		Constable Lori Shenher had come to the conclusion
15		that the missing women were missing and likely
16		victims, and I think she had convinced Sergeant
17		Field of that as well, and I think that's what
18		prompted this brainstorming session.
19	Q	That's important to hear. Thank you.
20		Analysis of last four years of DEYAS bad
21		trick list.
22		DEYAS?
23	А	Downtown Eastside Youth Association? It was an
24		active community group that worked in the Downtown
25		Eastside, although I might not have what the

Τ		acronym stands for correct.
2	Q	Analysis of similar police calls.
3		What does that mean?
4	А	I'm not sure. My guess it had to do with any sort
5		of police calls that relate to attacks on street
6		sex trade workers, anything relevant to the
7		missing women.
8	Q	And then a question:
9		Who has previously used services?
10		Meaning?
11	А	It could refer to customers, but I'm not sure.
12	Q	Thank you. Now, what's this comment:
13		Large amounts of cash or drugs would get them
14		anywhere.
15		Do you remember what that
16	А	No, I don't. Partly it might have been related to
17		the theory that the missing women were transient
18		and had moved on, and this would be some
19		discussion whether they had the capability to do
20		so, financial capability.
21	Q	Now, we've heard about this issue around
22		transient, and the commissioner's heard much about
23		the idea that the women were transient, they might
24		travel to different places to perform sexual
25		services as opposed to the evidence saying they

were anchored in the Downtown Eastside and not
transient. Were you alive to this debate that was
in the room as to whether these women were
transient and therefore that's why they weren't
being found?

A I believe this is an opinion held by Inspector

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Biddlecombe, but I don't think it was held by either Shenher or Field, so we really didn't spend a lot of time on it. The reality is that Vancouver has different types of street prostitution, and there are people on a circuit. A circuit would be Calgary, Vancouver, Victoria, Seattle, maybe even San Francisco. I remember once going to a meeting at the American Society of Criminology, staying at a hotel in downtown San Francisco and seeing a working girl on the street that I knew from Vancouver. So that does happen, but that is the high end part of the trade, you know, the woman that charged back then \$300 an hour. They may have pimps. That's very different than the typical prostitution activity that was occurring on Broadway and in the Downtown Eastside. In the case in particular of the Downtown Eastside because of the fact that many of the individuals involved with street prostitution

Т		are drug addicted, they don't have a lot of money,
2		they don't travel very far at all. Some of them
3		had physical and mental impairment. They did not
4		have cars. They didn't have money for airplane
5		tickets, it all went into their arm. They might
6		have pimps, but a typical pimp was just their
7		boyfriend. No syndicate, no travel to, you know,
8		the United States or other parts of Canada. You
9		would sometimes see these women go home. So they
10		might go to Victoria or Kamloops or Kelowna where
11		their family was and they might engage in
12		prostitution activities while they were back home,
13		but they were not on a circuit. The number of
14		women on a circuit was just a small elite group.
15	Q	So you didn't have a belief that women of the
16		Downtown Eastside were transient and therefore not
17		being found?
18	А	No, not at all.
19	Q	This comment about:
20		Enquire about other investigative techniques
21		used by other departments.
22		Can you help us?
23	А	Yes. This would have been an effort to reach out
24		to other police agencies in North America, maybe
25		in England, that had a similar problem with

1		missing sex trade workers and to try to find out
2		what they had done, what ideas, what investigative
3		approaches they may have used to assist them in
4		figuring out what was going on and resolving the
5		issue.
6	Q	And this second to last line:
7		Re-examine other dump sites NV
8		Meaning North Vancouver?
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	Pemberton?
11	А	Yes.
12	Q	And then Fraser Valley?
13	А	Yes.
14	Q	And do you remember that discussion, why that was
15		in the room for discussion?
16	А	There were some known murders of Vancouver
17		prostitutes where bodies had been dumped in remote
18		parts or isolated areas in the mountains of North
19		Vancouver and up in the Fraser Valley. I
20		mentioned the Pipe, Olajide, Younker case, and
21		some of us felt it was worthwhile taking another
22		look at these cases and see about possible
23		connections to the missing women.
24	Q	And then the last line I can't quite sort out what
25		Acc means. Do you see that last line?

1 Α Yes. 2 Acc I file re hooker run over in Burnaby. What was does that mean? 3 Q 4 Acc I was the Accident Investigation Squad, but I Α 5 have no idea what it's referring to. Though I 6 have -- again I don't know if this is relevant, 7 but towards the later '90s prostitution strolls began to emerge in Surrey, and to a lesser extent 8 9 in Burnaby and New Westminster, so maybe there was something going on in Burnaby that somebody 10 11 thought was relevant. I just don't know though. So that's the meeting, brainstorming session that 12 Q 13 gives rise presumably to Mr. Hovbrender sending 14 you the e-mail the next day? 15 Α Yes. His reference to fall on deaf ears is interesting. 16 0 17 Did you and he discuss that? The only thing I can remember discussing with 18 Α 19 Sergeant Hovbrender was after the temper tantrum 20 by Fred Biddlecombe he came up to me at the end of 21 the meeting, and Inspector Biddlecombe was his 22 boss, and he apologized to me for the behaviour of 23 Inspector Biddlecombe. Sergeant Hovbrender was 24 very smart, very capable -- or is a very smart, 25 very capable individual. I think that his

1	experiences were such that he was concerned that
2	this would not be treated appropriately and the
3	necessary resources to solve problems wouldn't be
4	deployed in a timely fashion, and I think he was
5	prophetic.
6	MR. VERTLIEB: If I may just finish the case assessment
7	discussion, Mr. Commissioner, and then we can
8	leave that. Well, you know, this may take some
9	time. I'm in your hands, Mr. Commissioner, on the
10	break, totally in your hands.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Are you moving on to a different area?
12	MR. VERTLIEB: Well, I want to deal with this case assessment
13	because it results from this brainstorming. It's
14	a different document he has prepared.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Well, we'll adjourn.
16	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned till two p.m.
17	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:26 P.M.)
18	(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:00 P.M.)
19	THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.
20	Mr. Commissioner, before we start, appendices C
21	and D of Exhibit 34 were marked for
22	identification, and those appendices will now
23	become part of Exhibit 34.
24	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
25	MR. VERTLIEB: Mr. Commissioner, just based on what I'm told

- 1 we're going to need to have the witness available
- 2 both tomorrow and Thursday, and we may need to sit
- a bit longer to finish him Thursday.
- 4 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
- 5 MR. VERTLIEB: So let me reflect on what the starting times we
- 6 should recommend to you for tomorrow and Thursday.
- 7 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
- 8 MR. VERTLIEB: But we will get through it based on the estimate
- 9 without you needing to make any order.
- 10 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
- 11 MR. VERTLIEB: So it's working.
- 12 THE COMMISSIONER: You have to leave, I take it, at some stage
- fairly soon?
- 14 THE WITNESS: Some stage, yes.
- 15 THE COMMISSIONER: You have other commitments?
- 16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
- 17 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. So when do you want to leave here?
- 18 THE WITNESS: I would really hope we're done by the end of
- 19 Thursday.
- 20 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
- 21 MR. VERTLIEB: And we had planned that, 'cause we've known that
- for some time through Mr. Skwarok.
- 23 THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
- 24 MR. VERTLIEB:
- 25 Q Let's then deal with the case assessment you

prepared, and it's dated May 25, 1999. Now, this 1 2 was in the LePard binder, LePard document Volume 3 1, Phase 3, tab 28. Now, just to help us 4 understand, when a police officer with a doctorate 5 in criminology does a case assessment, that's not 6 something we would see often in the policing 7 spheres I sense. Just tell us how often would you be doing this kind of assessment? 8 9 Α Well, it would be more typical in the section to do a full profile report. Because this wasn't 10 11 geographic profiling 'cause we didn't have the locations that would have been useful I tried to 12 13 use other approaches and techniques to provide 14 some value to the investigation, therefore rather 15 than calling it a profile report called it a case assessment. And there were really a couple of 16 17 main parts of this analyses that I thought were important, and some other comments I thought 18 19 should be committed to writing and submitted to 20 Deputy McGuinness, to Detective Constable Lori Shenher, to Fred Biddlecombe. 21 22 Q Okay. For your convenience it's your book 18, Mr. Commissioner. So tell us what you thought --23 we've got the document, we can read through it and 24 25 you've seen it before. So help us understand

where you think this would be of benefit to the 1 2 people you were working with at the Vancouver 3 Police Department? 4 Well, as we talked about up to this point there Α 5 was still a lot of uncertainty as to what was the 6 nature of this problem, and I did two major 7 analyses in here. The first one which we've touched upon is the fact that we had a 8 9 spatial-temporal cluster. Perhaps this could be a good point to go to the slides. 10 11 Okay. Thank you. The slides refer to the Q 12 presentation that the witness has prepared to 13 assist you understanding his evidence, and this 14 was sent out just in the last couple of days to 15 the participants. Ms. McKeachie is going to 16 assist in dealing with it. 17 At this point it was felt that there was 27 Α missing women on the list. The numbers, you know, 18 19 varied depending on Detective Shenher's 20 opportunities to find someone or to find more, but at this point we were looking at 27 people. 21 22 Q Okay. Just give me one second. Let's have the commissioner have the time to digest --23 24 THE COMMISSIONER: I have a copy before me. 25 MR. VERTLIEB: Okay. All right.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: I assume everybody can see. 2 MR. VERTLIEB: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 3 THE WITNESS: Mr. Commissioner, the project up here is really 4 pretty simple, but it's an approach used in 5 epidemiology where an epidemiologist might try to determine if an outbreak of a disease is 6 7 occurring. So, for example, too many cases of tuberculosis in Richmond. To determine if you do 8 9 have an outbreak you first of all have to know 10 what your baseline is, what is normal or typical. 11 And then if you have what they call a spatial-temporal cluster, which is just simply too 12 13 much happening in too small an area in too short a 14 time period, then that's an indicator that you 15 have an epidemic or an outbreak. So that was the 16 approach I did. The focus, the geographic focus 17 of course is the Downtown Eastside. More or less this oval tries to cover the area where most of 18 19 the women who worked that particular part of the 20 city, there were other red light districts, but 21 these disappearances were all associated with this 22 one red light district in one city, Vancouver. And then the other was could we see if there was 23 24 any sort of temporal aspect or timing aspect. 25 Were these clustering together in time.

## 1 MR. VERTLIEB: 2 So you've covered the page 4, the spatial-temporal Q cluster? 3 4 Well, this slide here shows you the pattern for Α 5 the 27 cases that we thought were relevant. As 6 you can see we've had --7 One second. Let everyone find that. I know the Q first number of pages -- just bear with me a 8 9 second. I know we had that. This is this graph that you were showing us earlier? 10 11 Α Yes, a slightly revised version with 27 people at this point. 12 We covered that this morning, Mr. Commissioner. 13 Q 14 Remember the graph following the information you 15 heard at the Carnegie Centre; correct? Yes, this is just an update on that, but to point 16 Α 17 out that we have one, none, two, none, one, none cases of unfound missing people from the Downtown 18 19 Eastside until we get to 1995 and then the numbers 20 jump, and they jump dramatically. They also jump significantly. And by significant I mean we can 21 22 take a look at the amount of variation over the 23 years and we would expect some random fluctuation 24 up or down, but this is such an extreme departure 25 from the normal pattern of activity that we would

call this a statistically significant cluster. So 1 2 something is going on. Just like an 3 epidemiologist, we have an outbreak which means 4 something that is abnormal has occurred. This is 5 a warning to us. 6 Now, that becomes page 2 of your case assessment Q 7 where you discuss statistical analysis? That is right, Mr. Commissioner. 8 Α 9 Q Thank you. So it's a warning something's wrong. We don't know what's wrong, but something's wrong, 10 11 is that a fair way of putting it? Yes, but I'd like to come back to that question of 12 Α 13 we don't know what is wrong in a few minutes, if I 14 may. 15 Thank you. So keep going, please. Q Now, if you remember the meeting in Deputy 16 Α 17 McGuinness's office in February with Inspector Biddlecombe, Biddlecombe argued that given time we 18 19 would find these people. We've had years to find 20 this group from 1978 to 1994, give us another two or three years, we'll find this cluster, it'll 21 22 disappear, and at that point I had argued that we 23 should get some data to check that out. And so 24 between these two time periods that's what I did, 25 obtain I think 803 reports of missing adult women

1		from '96 to '98 from the CPIC system in Ottawa,
2		and I was then able to calculate the survival rate
3		for a missing person. In other words, how long
4		does a missing person stay missing. So if you
5		would click. This is what we're interested in,
6		this cluster, and we have the argument from major
7		crime from the inspector.
8	Q	This is page 5 for the commissioner and everybody.
9		Sorry.
10	А	If we go to the next slide.
11	Q	I'm sorry. Just go back to that last slide. I
12		interrupted. I just want people to know what
13		page. And that's your comment, the major crime
14		section says we'll find them, just give us time.
15		All right.
16	А	So this data shows that most people are found
17		within two days.
18	Q	And that's from the data that you
19	А	From CPIC.
20	Q	From CPIC in Ottawa?
21	А	Correct.
22	Q	And prior to you doing this analysis had that
23		information been collected for the people in the
24		Vancouver Police Department?
25	А	No, this is a special request that I made to CPIC

for this data, so this was not a standard type of 1 2 analyses. One more slide. This just shows the 3 same data but presented another way, 4 Mr. Commissioner. And we can see after, say, 5 three weeks 93 percent of people are found. And 6 we're able to calculate various probabilities for 7 certain time intervals, but the bottom line is the cluster was not going to disappear. If a missing 8 9 person is going to be found they're generally found very quickly. I was able to estimate that 10 11 we could expect by chance to find approximately two individuals of the 27. But, Mr. Commissioner, 12 13 that still left 25 unfound missing people, a 14 cluster again from '95 to '98 that was 15 statistically significant. So the objection made 16 by Inspector Biddlecombe was not bourne out by the 17 fact by the data. We are not going to find these women. So it had nothing to do with the lag of 18 19 time, it's a problem. We don't know what the 20 problem is, but we do definitely have a problem. 21 And, again, this is based on your analysis, there Q 22 were 27 women missing, you assume two would be found. Statistically that was a conclusion? 23 24 That was a likely outcome. Α 25 Leaving 25 totally unaccounted for and time would 0

not help us find those people? 1 2 That's right. Α 3 All right. Q 4 So in this report I said that any explanation for Α 5 this outbreak, if I can use that term, for this 6 cluster of missing women had to be able to answer 7 three questions. The first one is basically why have so many sex trade workers gone missing from a 8 single area in a short time period? Why did we 9 not have this problem in the past? And very 10 11 importantly, why does it only involve women? Why do you say very importantly? 12 Q 13 Well, can I answer that question in a moment, Α 14 Mr. Commissioner? 15 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. THE WITNESS: If we go to the next slide, I've added some other 16 17 questions here too, because they become important when we look at the theories advanced by major 18 19 crime after this report was prepared. Obviously 20 this was a Vancouver problem, we didn't have any 21 other city in Western Canada. Even cities that 22 have skid roads equivalent to Vancouver, albeit maybe on a smaller scale, like Winnipeg, Regina, 23 Edmonton, although they may all have prostitution, 24 25 street prostitution areas, they were not

experiencing this problem. And, of course, we 2 don't even have any bodies that we're finding, so 3 it's not like these are just victims of necessarily ordinary violence. And what I mean by 4 that is the typical violence you would see in skid 5 6 road. 7 MR. VERTLIEB: 8 And in a typical violence issue in the skid road Q 9 environment the body would be found? Yes, it would be found in an alley or rooming 10 Α 11 house or maybe in a bar. I mean these are not sophisticated murders that go on in that part of 12 13 the city. So if we look at the next slide, and 14 here's where I hope to answer your question, major 15 crime put forward a number of theories over the course of these two years, the women are missing 16 17 and we can find them. But after the work of Detective Constable Shenher she was not able to 18 19 find them. She found a few, but she also found 20 more that were missing, so we ended up with this

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Another argument that was made were that these were pimp murders. It is a little bit

group of 27 at this point in time. And a lot of

investigative effort went in to trying to find

them.

embarrassing for me to tell you that my former department was putting forth some of these Hollywood-style theories. The typical Vancouver pimp, as I mentioned before, was a boyfriend, not somebody driving around in a Cadillac with a fancy hat and a stable of girls. And, furthermore, what would be the point of killing over two dozen working women. That from a pimp perspective is cutting your nose off to spite your face. That just is unheard of. It doesn't happen. I mean there is pimp violence, but this just makes no sense.

These are drug murders. Well, most of the drug trade involves males, not women. And while

These are drug murders. Well, most of the drug trade involves males, not women. And while we consider the questions that we were looking at at the other slide, you know, these theories aren't doing very good at explaining these things. Like why aren't there bodies? Why is this happening now and not before? Drug overdoses. Again why, and this is I think the key point, why only women? If it was drug overdoses we would expect to see both genders represented.

Another theory was an attempt to blame the hospitals and their recordkeeping. These are just sudden deaths and the records aren't there. Well,

if that was the case why are we not seeing males 1 as well as females? Why did this just happen now 2 3 and it's not happening elsewhere? None of these 4 theories from major crime explained what was going 5 I thought that the data could only be adequately explained by the possibility of a 6 7 serial killer. And if I could just quote from what I said in the report: 8 9 The conclusions of this analysis are as follows: 10 This is at page 3. 11 Q Yes, 583. 12 Α 13 1) the number of disappearances of sex trade workers from Vancouver's Downtown Eastside 14 15 during the previous 30 months is statistically significant and is unlikely to 16 17 have occurred by chance. 2) while it is not possible with available 18 19 information to determine with certainty the 20 cause of these disappearances, the most likely explanation for the majority of the 21 22 cases is a single murderer (or partner 23 murderers) preying on skid row prostitutes. 24 Now, if we consider foul play these women 25 really would unlikely be victims of separate

killers, because we have a similar modus operandi, 1 2 the same type of victim and the fact that the 3 bodies were not being found. Hiding a body is 4 actually a lot of work. It's not like what you 5 see in the detective fiction, it just is 6 complicated, it's difficult, and so most offenders 7 tend to just leave the body. At some point there was a suggestion maybe they're victims of multiple 8 9 serial killers, but that would be highly unlikely 10 given their concentrated time period, the same 11 neighbourhood and the same modus operandi. know that there was another serial killer 12 13 operating in the Downtown Eastside in 1995, 14 because we have the Pipe, Younker and, I'm sorry, I don't know how to properly pronounce her name. 15 16 Olajide. Q 17 Olajide murders that were linked. But the MO is a Α little bit different in that those bodies were not 18 19 effectively hidden. So the only thing that I 20 thought made sense was that we had a single serial 21 murderer or maybe two people involved working 22 together causing these disappearances. I would 23 like to say that I had no specific reason to say 24 two people, but I can tell you that there have 25 been a number of different studies looking at

this, and on average 25 percent of serial murder cases involve more than one offender. So just statistically there was maybe a one in four chance there was more than one person involved, but there was nothing specific in the evidence available, in the information available at this time that would suggest more than one. My point is it was one individual or a connected team.

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Maybe I could also say at this point, Mr. Commissioner, that this was one type of analyses, but there was also the efforts of Detective Constable Shenher which I think integrated into this. So if this level of analyses provides a certain level of confidence in assuming we had a serial killer, when you throw in the fact that despite considered effort it cannot be found, then you throw in what I think is almost damning evidence, which is the fact that they were unable to find these individuals collecting welfare anywhere else in the province, that to me almost makes it close to a certainty, 95 percent I would say at that point. And we don't know anything for certain at this point, but we're really seeing now a buildup of information pointing towards a serial murder theory.

So that leads to the next slide, So What Went 1 2 Wrong? Now, I want you, please, to help the 3 commissioner and all of us here understand your 4 background that assists in bringing that opinion 5 forward. So tell us, please, about -- I want to cover some areas. First, your expertise on the 6 7 academic side, and also on the criminal investigative failures. So let's just touch on 8 9 your academic qualifications to help the commissioner to understand what went wrong. 10 11 Α Well, since leaving -- well, actually even starting when I was with the Vancouver Police 12 13 Department, but since leaving I've had a number of 14 positions and duties related to conducting 15 research. I was the Director of Research for the 16 Police Foundation in Washington, DC, a management 17 consultant with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and then since 2003 a 18 19 research professor and then Endowed Chair at Texas 20 State University. I have two major areas that I 21 focus on. One is the geography of crime, 22 including geographic profiling and spatial patterns of crime, and the other is criminal 23 24 investigations, in particular criminal

investigative failures. A criminal investigative

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failure is simply an unsolved case that should have been solved or a wrongful conviction. In other words solving the case the wrong way. I see them as two sides of the same coin.

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I have two published books. One on geographic profiling, one on investigative failures. I have a number of publications in various academic referee journals and in police publications. In specific I would point that I've published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin two articles on the topic of criminal investigative failures, one in The Police Chief magazine which is the official publication of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and one article in the RCMP Gazette on this topic. I have given presentations and papers to a number of academic conferences, but also to police groups in different countries, to forensic scientists, to cold case detectives, sex crime detectives, homicide detectives, to prosecutors, defence attorneys, to politicians, and of course students and members of the public.

Since 1997 I've been a member of the

International Association of Chiefs of Police

Investigative Operations Committee, and I sit on

their Wrongful Conviction Subcommittee. And I've 1 2 had three specific projects related to this 3 particular area. One was a project I engaged in 4 with Professor Neil Boyd from Simon Fraser 5 University here on the Milgaard case while he was 6 still in prison, one was a review for a state politician in Massachusetts of a conviction of a 7 serial rapist -- sorry, a violent rapist, not a 8 9 serial rapist, and the other one was at the request of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, an 10 11 analysis of a wrongful conviction case. So I've researched, published, lectured, and worked on 12 13 cases involving wrongful convictions and criminal 14 investigative failures. 15 Why do you say that the criminal investigative Q failures and wrongful conviction are two sides to 16 the same -- two sides of the same coin? 17 Because in both cases the police got it wrong. 18 Α 19 And I want to be clear that not every unsolved 20 case is a failure, but there are many cases where the information was available, but for one reason 21 22 or another, and those reasons are often cognitive 23 biases like tunnel vision or organizational traps 24 like groupthink or failures to properly understand 25 the probability of something that have led to the

1		case not being solved, or the worst possible
2		outcome a focus on an innocent individual.
3	Q	Do you think tunnel vision and groupthink were at
4		play in the Pickton investigation?
5	А	Yes, I do. I think this is a dramatic example of
6		a criminal investigative failure. You don't have
7		that many people killed certainly after the case
8		had been brought to the attention of the police by
9		the community and not consider it a failure.
10	Q	When you use the word spatial in your work, the
11		expertise that you bring to this, what do you mean
12		by spatial?
13	А	Where something is geographically. And that could
14		be where it is in relationship to something else
15		in the city or where it's in relationship to
16		another crime event, neighbourhood
17		characteristics.
18	Q	So in the context of the mandate for our
19		commissioner it would relate to the Downtown
20		Eastside?
21	А	Well, I believe, Mr. Commissioner, your
22		recommendations I sure would hope would apply to
23		the whole province, but the problem here, the
24		missing women case there's a lot of unique
25		characteristics of the street trade, street

prostitution trade in places like skid road that 1 2 provided an almost perfect operating environment 3 for a predator like Pickton. 4 Why do you say that? Q 5 Well, if I'm able to go through the slides I could Α 6 talk about it in --7 Okay. Let's do that. Q In some detail. 8 Α 9 Q Okay. Let's do that. So the next slide, please, 10 after. Thank you. 11 Α I think I made this point, but I want to stress 12 it, that despite failings in my opinion of certain 13 individuals, it's not the case that anyone wants 14 to see a killer go free or a victim unavenged in a 15 police department, but if we were to consider what would happen if these victims had been from the 16 17 affluent west side of Vancouver, we know we would have had a very different outcome, a very 18 19 different response from the police. 20 Why do you say that? Q Because -- well, first of all other cases. 21 Α 22 if we look at -- there was a lot of media 23 attention, and a lot of credit should go to 24 Lindsay Kines and other reporters in The Vancouver 25 Sun who kept this on the agenda or at least

within, you know, the -- on the public play to the police as much as they would have liked it to go away, but it wasn't nearly the level of public media attention that we would have seen, say, like in the Bernardo case with the French and the Mahaffy murders, or in the Baton Rouge serial murders where women were disappearing from their homes, or what happened in the latter part of the Yorkshire Ripper case where Sutcliffe moved from prostitutes to students and working women. So we do know that there's going to be more media attention if the victims are from mainstream society versus a marginal group.

And we would also see a much greater political response. We know Mayor Phillip Owen's comments about not wanting to fund a location service for missing hookers that was so infamously caught on television. We know that this was not a regular part of discussion at the police board meetings. If these had been women from the middle or upper classes we would have seen so much more attention and focus and pressure on the police. So this is a very interesting question. As much as police want to catch killers we had a differential response that occurred in this case,

and so one of the key questions is why. 1 2 So the next slide, please. Q 3 I think that this case posed three significant Α 4 investigative challenges. And I'm going to come 5 back to these three points and talk about them at 6 the end, but let me please introduce them now. 7 And I think that this case would not have occurred if all three of these elements were not here, or 8 9 at least two of the three. The fact that the victims were sex trade workers, street prostitutes 10 11 from the lowest part of the city in terms of our various red light districts, the fact that the 12 13 bodies were not discovered, and the fact that the 14 women went missing from one police jurisdiction 15 but were being murdered in another police 16 jurisdiction caused real significant investigative 17 problems. And I think it's important, Mr. Commissioner, to pull out these particular 18 problems, 'cause any proposed solutions needs to 19 20 be aware of something like this happening again, 21 somebody taking advantage of these weak points in the system, if you will. 22 So let's analyze because of what you just said 23 0 24 about the importance of understanding these 25 factors, and given the commissioner's commitment

to make recommendations going forward, just take 1 us through why each of these are listed as 2 3 difficulties. So why is the fact that victims 4 were sex trade workers, for example, why does that 5 pose an investigative difficulty? 6 I do have some slides that address that, but can I Α 7 come back to them in a couple of minutes? Of course. Thank you. So we'll come back to 8 Q 9 those three? Right, but I'm laying them out as, I guess, 10 Α 11 elements of a perfect storm, if you will, for a predator. And we also have the fact that Willie 12 13 Pickton was what's called a stealth predator. A 14 stealth predator is someone who operates in such a 15 fashion that the authorities don't even know that murders are occurring, and that makes it of course 16 17 very difficult for a police response. We're not even investigating crimes because we don't know 18 19 crimes have happened. There's different types of 20 stealth predators. For example, we have angels of 21 death like Donald Harvey who murdered elderly 22 people in the hospital that he worked at, so they 23 appeared to be medical related or deaths related to the medical issues that had them in the 24 25 hospital in the first place. By the way, I should

mention that police often use statistical analyses 1 2 in those types of investigations. 3 Camouflage deaths. 4 Dorothea Puente, what was that? Q 5 She was what's called a custodial killer. She ran Α 6 a boarding house in Sacramento, and she murdered her elderly tenants and began to cash their Social 7 Security cheques, but because she had custody of 8 9 this place, people weren't visiting tenants, no one knew that any murders had occurred, which of 10 course allowed her to continue to collect the 11 12 cheques. 13 Okay. Thank you. So camouflage deaths? Q A good example -- these are where the authorities 14 Α 15 know deaths are occurring, but they appear to be something other than murder. A good example is 16 17 Dr. Harold Shipman who in the United Kingdom murdered over a hundred women, and he wrote them 18 19 up -- he was their attending physician and he 20 wrote them up as natural causes, but he was actually murdering them. 21 22 Q Next category? This is what -- we can say that Robert Pickton 23 24 fell into these two categories. This is one of 25 them, missing persons. So all the authorities are

really aware of is that people might be missing, 1 2 and in some cases they don't even know that 3 because of the nature of the victims, especially 4 when we consider marginal groups. So, for 5 example, Dr. Holmes preyed on women who were 6 visitors to the World's Fair in Chicago in the 7 late 1800s. So all the families knew is that their daughter or sister went off to the World's 8 9 Fair and never came home. And he constructed a -or had a rooming house in which he was able to 10 11 kill them. Similarly the Wests --That's the book The Devil in the White City? 12 Q 13 Yes, it is. A very good book. Fred West and Α Rosemary West, his wife, murdered a number of, I 14 15 would call them, semi street youth. They would take them into their home. Many of these were 16 17 runaways from their home. So the family might have listed them as being missing, but they went 18 19 missing two years ago before they encounter the 20 Wests, and the Wests picked a very good target 21 group because there isn't going to be much of a 22 reaction when they go missing again, if you see 23 what I mean. So it was like 1980 they went 24 missing from their home, he encounters them in 25 '82, kills them, buries them in his backyard, and

no one really knows what's going on. He only got caught because he targeted one of his own children.

And then marginal victims. Jeffrey Dahmer picking up men in nightclubs and on the street from the gay community, many of them also runaways from home, people without a whole lot of power or jobs or connections in Milwaukee. John Wayne Gacy doing something similar, picking up young men from the street to come and do work in his house, and of course they never got out again. So stealth predators operate in such a fashion that the authorities do not realize they have a murder going on, and you could say that's what Pickton was doing, and that is another investigative challenge that the police face.

However, this particular case had a lot of investigative breaks. So I talk about some of the difficulties, but the really frustrating thing was there were a lot of breaks here that almost allowed the case to be resolved in a much more timely fashion than it was. For example, Pickton was identified as a prime suspect very early on, I believe as early as 1998. Pickton was --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MS. TOBIAS: Mr. Commissioner, Cheryl Tobias for the Government 1 2 of Canada. I've listened with great interest, as I know you have, to Professor Rossmo's evidence, 3 4 and he is one of those witnesses who at the same 5 time have an expertise that understandably you're 6 interested in and participated -- had some 7 participation in at least the preliminary stages of some of the investigations that you are 8 9 reviewing. Now, I appreciate that as an expert, 10 although as I indicated to my learned friend 11 earlier we weren't aware until very recently that Dr. Rossmo was going to be commenting on the case 12 13 as a whole as an expert, my concern is that the facts, for example, that you see on this slide 14 15 here, some of them are really conclusions that 16 have not been put before you in any kind of 17 evidence, and moreover they are conclusions that 18 in some respect are matters of great contention. They are matters -- they are facts, if you can 19 20 call them that, very much in issue. So while I 21 appreciate that it's not always possible to, in 22 effect, lead your fact witnesses and then have your expert, and so forth, it's not always 23 24 convenient to do that, nevertheless it's my 25 submission that with a witness like Dr. Rossmo

it's essential that you know the basis for him making certain conclusions of fact when they're stated here.

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Now, Dr. Rossmo talks about Pickton being identified as a prime suspect early in the investigation, and so I'm simply asking that it be clear on the record, first of all, what investigation he's talking about, because there are multiple investigations before you. And it does not appear from anything that Dr. Rossmo said, for example, that he participated in any respect in the investigation into Mr. Pickton that occurred in Coquitlam, nor in some of the other investigations. So for him to tell you that Pickton was identified as a prime suspect, or that indeed Pickton was not very smart, or that there were witnesses to Pickton's crimes, those are general conclusory comments. And the evidence that he gives without the proper foundation is in my respectful submission unhelpful, to say the least, and extremely prejudicial at worst. concern here is that a foundation be firmly established. This witness should not pronounce on facts that are not in evidence and are hotly disputed.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Haven't we heard all types of evidence
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                   already that Pickton was a prime suspect, and
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                   haven't we heard that already?
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      MS. TOBIAS:
                   Well, we've heard that he was a suspect, but we
 5
                   don't know which investigation, for example, is
 6
                   being discussed. We don't know about Evenhanded,
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                   we don't know if he's talking about Coquitlam. We
                   don't know that Pickton was not very smart. We
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                   certainly -- so not all of these statements --
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                   these are very general statements, they're
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                   conclusory statements. And I appreciate I'm
                   stepping in front of Mr. Vertlieb a little bit,
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                   but I do wish to express my concern, and I see
                   certain of my friends --
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      THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Hira.
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      MR. HIRA: Let's put this in some factual context. A, to the
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                   extent that Dr. Rossmo is giving evidence
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                   regarding the Vancouver Police investigation that
19
                   he was involved in we have no objection. He's
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                   entitled to do so, he was there.
      THE COMMISSIONER: He was there.
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      MR. HIRA: Right. B, to the extent that he's assisting us with
                   respect to geographic profiling, serial killers,
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                   matters of that nature there cannot be any
25
                   reasonable objection. But to the extent that he's
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1	talking about the RCMP, the Coquitlam RCMP file,
2	he makes it very clear in his interview with
3	Deputy Chief Evans, and I'm happy to take you to
4	the passages, that he didn't review the file, he
5	has not sufficient knowledge of it, that his only
6	knowledge comes from reading a bit of the LePard
7	report which makes him reviewing a review. So I
8	have no difficulty with any of this material
9	provided that it's clearly understood by you,
10	Mr. Commissioner, that he's commenting on the
11	Vancouver investigation and not on the Coquitlam
12	RCMP investigation.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Vertlieb.
14	MS. WINTERINGHAM: Mr. Commissioner, if I could, please.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
16	MS. WINTERINGHAM: Just with respect to Project Evenhanded, and
17	in fairness to Mr. Rossmo here, my understanding
18	from reading his interview with Deputy Chief Evans
19	is that he was basing his slide show and his
20	presentation on the LePard analysis.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
22	MS. WINTERINGHAM: And LePard made it very clear that he was
23	not looking at Project Evenhanded. Kim Rossmo
24	goes on to say in his interview with Deputy Chief
25	Evans that he hasn't spoken to anybody from

Project Evenhanded. So just in terms of a 1 2 practical objection I can advise you this, if Kim 3 Rossmo goes into Project Evenhanded and comments 4 on it, it is my respectful submission that it's 5 based on inaccurate information or no information, 6 and my cross-examination will have to be much 7 longer of Kim Rossmo in order to correct the record, and others will have to come forward and 8 9 take up time of the commission to correct the 10 record. 11 And I say this also, when you review the Evans interview of Mr. Rossmo, she has to correct 12 13 him on the Project Evenhanded aspects of the 14 investigation. For example, Mr. Rossmo improperly 15 and wrongly suggests that Project Evenhanded wasn't interested in the February 5th, 2000 16 17 search. That's wrong. And so if we spend time on this we're going to have to spend time correcting 18 it. 19 20 I'll give you the page references, Mr. Commissioner, MR. HIRA: 21 in the Evans interview where he repeatedly says he 22 doesn't have knowledge and gets it wrong. For 23 example, he doesn't know that surveillance was 24 conducted, which will require extensive 25 cross-examination. Just for your reference

they're pages 52, 56, 71, 74 in particular where 1 2 he says he didn't know enough about the RCMP 3 investigation, and 75. So what you are doing is 4 opening up considerable cross-examination. 5 THE COMMISSIONER: No, we're not. 6 MR. HIRA: I think you have my point, Mr. Commissioner. 7 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Are you going to tell me the same thing? 8 9 MR. GRATL: No, I was going to try to make a helpful suggestion, Mr. Commissioner. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. 11 12 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Commissioner, we need names of all the 13 parties to make sure the record is clear. 14 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, go ahead, Mr. Gratl. 15 MR. GRATL: Jason Gratl for Downtown Eastside interests. I was just going to try to suggest that you treat this 16 17 investigative breaks evidence as though it's some conclusions drawn on the basis of some assumptions 18 19 in exactly the way that the Lavalin case suggests 20 that expert evidence be treated, expert evidence that's based on hearsay. 21 22 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. Mr. Vertlieb. MR. VERTLIEB: Mr. Hira and Ms. Winteringham have given you 23 fair comment, and that will no doubt be elicited 24 25 when he explains why he gives his report, because

I was going to ask him to tell us about why you 1 2 make those comments, because his comments are of 3 help, and they're of more assistance when he tells 4 you why to help you frame recommendations. 5 THE COMMISSIONER: So you're saying that whatever objections 6 they have are premature? 7 MR. VERTLIEB: Yes. It will emerge that he's not passing comment on the RCMP Coquitlam file or Evenhanded, 8 because he didn't look at them. 9 MR. HIRA: And if that's the case we have no difficulty. If 10 11 that's clearly understood we have no difficulty. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Go ahead. 12 13 MR. VERTLIEB: 14 Professor, you've heard this discussion, you 0 15 understand the concerns of some of the lawyers. You did not review the Coquitlam file or 16 17 Evenhanded in terms of what they were trying to do? 18 I really have nothing to say in my presentation or 19 Α 20 analysis about Project Evenhanded, that occurred after I left. What I do have to say is based on 21 22 my personal experiences, the LePard report, and the Evans report. There is some discussion of the 23 24 Coquitlam part of the investigation though. 25 Yes, I understand that. 0

1 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. MR. VERTLIEB: And LePard has covered that as well in his 2 3 report. So let's just take you through the 4 commentary and then if any of the lawyers feel the 5 need to deal with it in more detail they're 6 obviously free to do so. I think that's a fair 7 way to do it. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Go ahead. 8 9 MR. VERTLIEB: So you say that he was identified as a prime 10 0 11 suspect. I won't take you through all the evidence about that, just tell us in a capsulized 12 13 way why you say that? 14 Bill Hiscox phoned the Vancouver Police Department Α 15 in 1998, I believe, regarding Pickton, but I first heard of Pickton in the summer of '99 when 16 17 Detective Constable Shenher spoke to me about him, and I know that Project Amelia saw him as one of 18 19 their prime suspects at that point in time. 20 So tell us what you were told in '99 when you were Q 21 working in the Vancouver Police Department doing 22 your work there? 23 There's a tip had been received about a man who Α 24 had been charged in the attempted murder of a 25 prostitute, he had a pig farm and I believe I was

told a wood chipper, but it might have been a meat 1 2 grinder which would have served as useful -- he 3 had a good place and tools available to make 4 bodies disappear. He was quite a strange 5 individual. We talked about the possibility of 6 recovering human DNA evidence from the wood 7 chipper, the meat grinder. Who did you talk with about that? 8 Q Detective Constable Shenher. And I remember 9 Α saying to her that you know that this is going to 10 11 take a lot of surveillance to get the necessary evidence. 12 And this was in the summer of '99? 13 0 14 Spring or summer after Project Amelia had started, Α 15 which I believe had started at the end of May of 1999. 16 17 The next comment that Pickton was a prolific Q serial killer. Help us understand why you make 18 19 that comment to the commissioner today? 20 If we take a look at the cases he's suspected of, Α 21 and even the cases he was charged with, we see 22 periods where he's engaged in committing a murder 23 anywhere from once every four weeks to once every 24 eight weeks. Some serial killers engage in a 25 murder once a year or once every two years. So he

was reasonably active, which makes it an easier 1 2 case to investigate. I don't think Mr. Pickton 3 was very smart based on everything I've read about him, his school performance, but also some of his 4 5 actions in terms of the crime. He might have been 6 street smart, but he was also careless and engaged 7 in activity which made him easier to catch. fact, ultimately that's how he was caught. 8 9 Q When you say careless what do you mean? Leaving evidence around. 10 Α 11 Now, that fact would not apparently have been 0 known at the time because no one had been on his 12 home -- in his home? 13 14 No, but it still was a break for the Α 15 investigation. In fact ultimately the break. So it was a break that was there to be taken 16 Q 17 advantage of if events had come together the way you feel they could have? 18 19 Correct. Α 20 Now, tell us about the surviving victim? Q 21 One of the things investigators look for in serial Α 22 murder cases are what they call a surviving 23 victim, someone, Mr. Commissioner, who was able to escape from the offender. Of course here the 24 25 issue was was that case linked to the missing

1 women. 2 Let me just stop you for a second. We refer to Q 3 that as Ms. Anderson in 1997, some say victim 97, 4 just so you know. 5 Thank you. Such a victim can provide Α 6 identification, a description of the modus 7 operandi, details about how the offender is operating. In fact because of this surviving 8 9 victim Pickton first came onto the radar of the police, so that was another break. 10 11 And that surviving victim related to an attack. 0 12 Where did you understand the attack to have taken 13 place in terms of geography, which city? 14 Α Coquitlam. 15 And you knew that back in 1998 and '99 when you Q were aware of this case? 16 17 Spring or summer of 1999. Α Thank you. Now, the next comment you make, there 18 Q 19 were witnesses to Pickton's crime. Just tell the 20 commissioner, please, why you say that as an investigative break? 21 22 Α Again this led to -- this was a factor that led to 23 Pickton being on the radar of the police. In fact he was on the radar for two reasons. One is that 24 25 Corporal Connor was concerned about this case and

about Pickton, and the other one was Bill Hiscox 1 2 phoning the Vancouver Police Department. Bill 3 Hiscox had been told certain things by individuals 4 who had seen things regarding Pickton's activities 5 on the farm. So even though these are difficult 6 crimes to solve, there were a lot of breaks that 7 the police had that were exploited, but could have been exploited more fully with proper resources. 8 9 The final point was, and of course as we said this is what ultimately led to his arrest, was he 10 11 just left physical evidence, identification, an inhaler, of victims in plain view in his house on 12 13 the farm. And Hiscox you became aware, if you recall I asked 14 0 15 you this morning about awareness in '98, and your answer was no, you didn't know about that? 16 17 No, not till '99. Α Thank you. That's what I wanted to clarify. So 18 Q to help the commissioner appreciate why this 19 20 investigation went the way it did let's turn to the next slide, please. This almost looks like a 21 22 Venn diagram from school. Yes. You have about 800 pages of report material 23 Α from Evans and LePard and characterizations of a 24 25 number of things that went wrong, different

I think one

actions by different individuals, but to try to 1 2 get some understanding of that it's useful to have 3 a framework. And we can take a look at three categories of things; failures by people, 4 5 personnel failures, problems within organizations, 6 and then situational factors. I can explain each 7 of these in turn, but I would like to stress that most investigative failures involve multiple 8 9 causes just like an airplane crash. The system is 10 robust, usually one problem is not going to cause 11 a failure, but when you have an intersection of a number of them it can lead to a big problem. 12 13 Please go through this. Q Okay. I'll start with personnel failures. 14 Α 15 are individual level problems, and they often 16 involve poor decision making or flawed judgments. 17 Some of the questions you might want to consider 18 in the analysis of any particular case of a failure were did detectives have the necessary 19 20 knowledge, experience and training. 21 of the issues at least with Inspector Biddlecombe 22 is that he did not know much about prostitution,

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street prostitution, did not know much about skid

road, did not know much about serial murder, and

he did not avail himself of people that did know

about those fields.

Did personnel follow correct procedures and legal requirements? Did investigators logically analyze the evidence or did they place too much emphasis on their gut feelings or their intuition and the opinions of a few strong personalities? Did investigators make distinctions between assumptions, hypotheses and facts? And the next one is particularly important. Did detectives suffer from the various forms of cognitive bias, which is tunnel vision? Did investigators move too quickly from following the evidence to chasing suspects? Next page.

- Q We're all on the personnel failures.
- A Second page of personnel failures. Did personnel suffer from stress, pressure or lack of sleep?

  Were there individuals that were just incompetent or lazy? Did investigators understand the implications of the uncertainties in the case and evidence probabilities? Did detectives exhibit problematic ego or stubbornness? Were the appropriate experts consulted as needed? Did investigative personnel fail to share information or fully co-operate with others? Were supervisors and managers kept properly informed of the

progress of the case, the difficulties, and did 1 they understand all the problems and challenges? 2 3 Please let me be clear that these list of 4 questions that you might want to consider are 5 generic and may or may not apply to the missing 6 women investigation. 7 Now, in terms of these questions though, are these Q questions commonly seen in other failed 8 9 investigations, and in particular serial murder investigations? 10 11 Α These are issues of potential problems that have 12 been identified in other investigative failures, 13 not specifically serial murder, but just 14 generally. 15 So I want to ask you one question before we move Q on to the potential questions the commissioner is 16 17 being asked to consider in your opinion, and that is this. Does effective supervision serve to 18 19 correct the personnel failures or the human 20 failures that you've just outlined? It can certainly mitigate against that. 21 Α 22 0 Thank you. Let's move to the organizational 23 problems. 24 Organizational problems are those inherent in the 25 structure, procedure, policies, training, or

resources of the police agency. So were there 1 2 overlapping police jurisdictions and unclear 3 responsibilities? Were the proper people selected to work on the investigation? Were there enough 4 5 resources in terms of personnel, equipment, 6 clerical and computer support to properly and 7 fully investigate the crime and its suspects? Were there organizational policies or procedures 8 9 that were problematic? Did groupthink occur, 10 where a dominant opinion resulted that people were 11 unwilling to challenge even when new evidence accumulated? Was the investigation properly 12 13 supervised and was management engaged? Did 14 transfer of personnel or their replacement or retirement cause problems? Were there internal 15 16 conflicts within an agency or conflicts between 17 agencies? Does the agency culture value justice in the law or just getting the bad guy? 18 Now, I'm not going to ask you to go through each 19 Q 20 of these problems and put the evidence we've heard 21 to you because the commissioner has a good 22 understanding of what he's heard over the last 23 number of weeks, but these are concerns that you 24 see in your expertise and in your experience where 25 there have been failed investigations?

Yes. And I don't want to say this is an 1 Α 2 exhaustive list, but these are some common and key 3 problems, and they're important questions to 4 consider whether these played a role in a failure. 5 The very last point you made, does agency culture 0 6 value justice and law getting the bad guy. You 7 mentioned the word culture. Does culture exist in an organization such as a police department? 8 9 Α Yeah, a very strong subculture in police agencies. And why do you say that, why do you say very 10 Q 11 strong? It's well known, it's well identified. Everything 12 Α 13 from the fact of wearing a common uniform to the 14 intensive training that the police receive. 15 Sometimes we hear the expression the thin blue line. So police agencies are well known to have 16 17 strong subcultures that can be both good and bad. So dealing with the strong police culture, when 18 Q 19 you've got organizational problems that you've 20 outlined on this document for us, can police strong culture make the organizational problems 21 22 worse? 23 Yes, it can. It depends what are the Α 24 characteristics of the subculture. So, for 25 example, if one of your cultural -- thinks that a

cultural belief is we just have to get the bad 1 2 guy, that can lead to wrongful convictions because 3 it becomes dominant. If, Mr. Commissioner, the 4 organizational culture is let's find out the 5 truth, then that could mitigate against the risk 6 of a wrongful conviction. 7 So the culture can either work in a positive way Q or in a negative way? 8 9 Α Correct. Which in your opinion existed at the time in the 10 Q 11 Vancouver Police Department? I would say both. There were both good and bad 12 Α 13 aspects. I could say that within the Vancouver 14 Police Department at that time our organization 15 suffered from a number, not all, but a number of managers and executives more engaged in internal 16 17 political infighting than in an external provision of service. We were suffering from a lack of 18 19 resources which affected how we dealt with 20 problems. And perhaps most problematic there was 21 a lack of managerial accountability. Individuals 22 wanted authority, but they didn't want 23 responsibility. By the way, that's certainly not unique to the VPD, and one of the reasons the New 24 25 York Police Department established the CompStat

process was to set management accountability for 1 2 crime problems. 3 So what does accountability mean when you use that Q 4 term? 5 Well, maybe I could quote Harry Truman with this Α plate on his desk saying "The buck stops here." 6 7 If someone is in charge of something then they're in charge of it. They control it and they're 8 9 responsible for the outcome of what occurs. And that goes up the chain of command, I mean 10 11 ultimately all the way to the chief constable, but 12 you have to own the problems that are assigned to you. They're not someone else's. I can make this 13 14 argument about Inspector Greer, that even though 15 the focus of this missing women problem got shifted to major crime, they were still his 16 17 people, his citizens in his community that he was supposed to protect, so he had to have 18 19 accountability for them. 20 But is it fair to say you're no more critical of Q Greer than anybody else in this failed 21 22 investigation? 23 I would say I'm disappointed in Gary Greer. I Α 24 thought he had more potential to stand up to it, 25 but he really did step aside so his role became --

mind you I wish it hadn't have, but that's what 1 2 occurred. 3 But if systemically the organization is working, Q 4 these are obvious human errors, that's where the system is important to protect against the human 5 6 error? 7 One of the problems, Mr. Commissioner, is that in Α a paramilitary organization you tend to just have 8 9 one person responsible or no people responsible, 10 but in some cases there may need to be two people 11 responsible. So even if major crime is responsible for the investigation, Inspector Greer 12 is responsible for the safety of his people. I 13 14 don't think a police organization knows how to 15 handle that dual responsibility. I hope that 16 makes sense. 17 Yes, it does. Let's discuss then situational Q factors, slide 19. 18 19 Okay. These are factors, Mr. Commissioner, that Α 20 are external to the control of the police or government, and they're very often related to the 21 22 characteristics of the crime. So, for example, 23 the nature of the offender-victim relationship. 24 We're much better at solving homicides -- most 25 homicides involve people who know each other, but

stranger-on-stranger crimes are much more 1 2 difficult to solve 'cause there is no 3 relationship. The investigative difficulty of the 4 crime. Did victim, witness, informant, media, or 5 community factors create more challenges for the 6 police? And sometimes just chance or bad luck can play a role. It's important to understand the 7 role of situational factors, but they should not 8 9 become excuses for investigative deficiencies. 10 could look at this as the hand the police get 11 dealt, and you can't control that so your organization needs to be able to handle whatever 12 it is that fate hands you, and it doesn't matter 13 14 how difficult it is, you need to be able to figure 15 out a way to respond. So when we -- we've heard from other people about 16 Q 17 the fact that there was no body that was being found and that posed unique challenges, is that 18 19 the focus of the comment you just made to the 20 commissioner? 21 That would be a very good example. It was a Α 22 problem, but, okay, let's figure out how to deal with that problem. One of the things that major 23 24 crime said was there's no bodies, there's nothing 25 we can do, which I would characterize as being

like a fire department saying we see smoke, but we don't see any fire, so we're not going to do anything. Well, the rally at the fire department is go and check it out, put some effort into it. And that doesn't always happen the way it should in policing. So I guess really in a way we're arguing that, you know, don't make excuses. community needs to be protected, the community wants to be protected, they don't really care about excuses. 

- Q So this leads us to slides 20, the refusal to accept serial killer theory.
- A These next two slides show you my analysis based on the LePard and Evans report and my experiences of what went wrong in the Vancouver Police

  Department and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigations. These are my impressions based on those documents. They're simplistic, but designed to show an overview of what occurred. They're not meant to be comprehensive. I'm sure people could argue or niggle about various points on them, but I think these are at least the key factors. And what I wanted to do was to try to simplify and digest a lot of the data and the information in the reports that have been done to date. But even

more importantly, Mr. Commissioner, is to show the 1 2 interaction of how some of these things occurred 3 and how there was a potentiation of them feeding 4 off of each other and then making things worse. 5 And I truly believe it's this type of analysis 6 that will allow the proper identification of 7 potential solutions. I mean we could talk about an individual's problems, their ego or their lack 8 9 of knowledge or whatever, but the reality is that 10 these people, almost all of them involved in these 11 cases, are retired, yet we know in the future we will have other individuals with other human 12 13 frailties. We can try to minimize that by 14 selection of the right people in training, but 15 we'll be much more powerful in preventing a 16 reoccurrence of this tragedy by understanding how 17 these things may be connected together and designing procedures or systems or checks and 18 19 balances so that the risk is at least seriously 20 mitigated and hopefully totally prevented. So this -- you are saying to the commissioner that 21 Q 22 this may be helpful to him in his recommendations to deal with what is inevitably in the future to 23 24 be other human error because that's just what 25 happens in the universe?

I hope so. 1 Α

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- Okay. Well, let's just have you take us through this sheet so we can understand it with a view to always giving the commissioner the benefit of your expertise to assist him with his recommendations.
- Okay. First of all we'll look at the Vancouver Α Police Department. If I could point to the lower left there's a little scale or legend showing the blue circles are personnel related problems, green squares are organizational problems, and red hexagons are situational problems. So first -oh, can we back -- yeah. And let me start off by saying the dominant explanation, the main thing that Vancouver got wrong according to the LePard report and according to my own experiences was a refusal to accept the serial killer at least in any timely fashion.

So the first thing is we can look at the fact that as we've discussed these were stranger crimes. No bodies were found. Because they were engaged in street prostitution there were just a lot of suspects. Unfortunately there's many, many dangerous predators out there that do commonly attack these women. The witnesses were unco-operative and unreliable, a function of their

involvement in drugs and lack of trust of the police. And because of the fact that some of these victims are not reported missing for a long time period it was difficult for the police to establish timelines or definitive points when they went missing, which made it more challenging to figure out what suspects to eliminate. To commonly eliminate suspects is they could show that they were with somebody or had an alibi or were out of town when the crime occurred, but the envelopes for these crimes was often weeks and some cases even months.

I believe the major problem engaged in by our management, particularly in major crime, was disengagement. They made up their mind and they really didn't put a lot of time and attention.

Certainly not the time and attention a case of this seriousness warranted. The disengagement was partly fed by ongoing sickness and impending retirements and ultimately retirements. So we had change of command of our major crime section, but also with the inspector away for significant time periods.

The fact that the victims were from a marginal group of society meant there was limited

public and political pressure, so this allowed management to stay disengaged. There was no rattling of their cages by the politicians or by the chief constable.

The VPD was experiencing new and serious budget cuts which created resource limitations which also was a big factor, and again management disengagement prevented the fight for resources of a sufficient level to deal with this problem.

Q Why do you -- how do you mean that?

The biggest -- I mean we've talked about refusal to accept the serial killer theory here, but underlying that is it was a fight over resources for different priorities, and if management really felt that there was a serial killer theory -- sorry, if they really felt that there was a legitimate risk of a serial killer I'm sure they would have fought much harder for more resources, and that did not happen.

As discussed there was a problem with management ego and their ignorance of the situation. And by situation I mean the lifestyle of these women, the fact that they were not transient. The significance of them not showing up on the welfare radar again. Even the nature of

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serial killers. I mean just one example, I think both agencies showed us that there is a belief that the missing problem had disappeared, that it was a thing in the past, yet any analysis of serial killer patterns showed that they often engage in periods of remission. So they're active, they don't do anything for some months or even a few years, they engage again, so it was a much more logical conclusion that the offender was just in remission and going to strike again rather than that he had retired. That led to groupthink and the failure to follow major crime management principles, ultimate groupthink able to survive, and again this led to the refusal to accept the serial killer theory.

So what I've tried to do here is to show how these things contributed, but also interact with each other in creating an ultimate problem which VPD did not accept at the right time period the serial killer theory. They eventually did, but easily one to two years later than they should have in my opinion.

- Q So this, in effect, becomes the analogy to a plane crash, a multifactorial all coming together?
- A Yes. Now, we can easily remove a couple of these

and we probably wouldn't see a change, but we also 1 2 know it wasn't just one aspect of this that caused 3 the problem. All right. You've explained that sheet. Let's 4 Q 5 deal with the issue around the failure to properly 6 investigate Pickton. 7 Okay. This, and again I'll stress we're not Α talking about Project Evenhanded, but we are 8 9 talking about the Coquitlam aspect of the investigation into Pickton. We start off again 10 with situational factors. No bodies were found, 11 the witnesses were unco-operative and unreliable, 12 13 and there was difficulty in establishing 14 timelines. Again the victims were marginal which led to limited public and political pressure. 15 We also had divided jurisdictions and 16 17 responsibilities and poor co-ordination both within the RCMP and between the RCMP and the VPD. 18 19 This ties into what we said earlier where we had 20 the women missing from Vancouver, but Pickton was 21 murdering them on his farm in Coquitlam. 22 The RCMP also experienced serious resource 23 limitations. They had a number -- of course tied to that was a number of other demands on those 24 25 resources including a number of other murder

1 files.

- Q Just keep in mind as you're going through this because the commissioner sits as a commissioner of a provincial inquiry he is not able to deal with policy and training and management issues around the RCMP, and he knows that and that's been discussed. We're just interested in the events as it relates to the individuals to help explain going forward how your evidence can be of assistance.
- A Okay. Another problem was the transfer of a very important key investigator, promotion and transfer of Corporal Connor, which occurred at a very unfortunate time. There also was situational ignorance from the Provincial Unsolved Homicide Unit in their dismissal of potential sources of informant information I think led to groupthink that this was not a serial murder case. And then finally there was a bit of tunnel vision later on in relationship to the possibility which became overemphasized of the Pipe, Olajide and the Younker murders being linked to the missing women case. I mean it was a very good investigative lead. If this case was happening today any good investigator would say yes, we have to explore

those. But it's not an either/or, and Pickton remained a strong suspect. There is nothing really done that eliminated him or made him less of a suspect. And often investigations tend to focus on in a linear fashion, Mr. Commissioner, on just one suspect or one theory and seem to have difficulty juggling multiple viable theories.

I should emphasize that my analysis of the RCMP Coquitlam investigation is fairly sketchy 'cause the LePard report did not have much information, at least at the same level of detail as the VPD investigation. There was a bit more in the Evans report, and the RCMP report, those parts that weren't redacted was not useful at all. So there may be a lot more that went on with the RCMP that I'm just not aware of.

- Q That's fine. When you mention the multiple suspects and police organizations sometimes just focus on one, that again would be a systemic concern that you would not be surprised to see as has happened here perhaps?
- A Not at all. Investigations seem to be sometimes run more as a bureaucratic enterprise than a logical, analytic, deductive, inductive process that follows the evidence and leads to the truth.

2 Please. 0 3 So a very important question for all of us is what Α 4 about next time, because there will be a next 5 time. And these are not all, but some of the 6 terms of reference for the commission of inquiry. 7 I've talked today about my personal experiences in the beginning, but I think it's also very 8 9 important to look at the next two items, and what I've tried to do is just provide at least a small 10 11 bit of perspective and information that might be useful to the inquiry in terms of the second and 12 13 the third goals. 14 So now we're coming back to these investigative difficulties, because I think that 15 16

So the next slide?

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investigative difficulties, because I think that if we do see a reoccurrence of a Pickton it's going to follow a similar pattern where victims or sex trade workers, multiple jurisdictions are found, and/or maybe bodies are not being located. And this, as I promised earlier, provides a little more framework to what occurred. So the marginal social status of these victims minimize community and political pressure and allowed police management to remain disengaged. Some of the investigators and many of the managers did not

properly understand the lifestyle of these 1 2 victims, and they didn't consult or listen to officers who did understand. 3 4 Now, this -- this is going forward the same could Q 5 happen again? 6 Yes, street prostitution is dangerous. I believe Α 7 you already heard evidence that the overall murder risk rate in the Vancouver area is 60 to 120 times 8 9 greater than average murder risk rate for a woman. So these women are at high risk. One of the most 10 11 comprehensive studies, recent studies of serial murder in the United States showed that 39 percent 12 13 of serial murder victims were known prostitutes. 14 And that puts them -- I mean, considering they 15 comprise a small part of society, puts them at very high risk of these types of predators. I 16 17 mentioned earlier my involvement in the RCMP Project Eclipse which looked at the murders of 25 18 19 women, most of them involved with the sex trade, 20 15 specifically were prostitutes from Vancouver, killed from 1985 to 1991. 21 22 I'm sorry, go ahead. Q I also say we have Inspector Biddlecombe's report 23 Α 24 of the number of prostitute murders that occurred 25 in Vancouver in those years. So murder is

something that is quite rare, but for a street 1 2 prostitute murder is something you really have to 3 worry about. And we're not even counting, 4 Mr. Commissioner, the assaults, the rapes, the 5 sexual abuse, sometimes torture they have to put 6 up with. So they are at high risk. 7 What was Project Eclipse? Q It was an effort by the RCMP to look at a number 8 Α 9 of attacks in -- well, specifically murders of women, most of them street prostitutes, in the 10 11 Vancouver and Victoria area trying to identify 12 possible links between crimes and the identification of a serial murder which then would 13 14 allow profiles to be generated and investigative 15 strategies to be suggested to the investigators. These were all unsolved cases. 16 17 And you worked on that? Q 18 Α I was part of it, yes. 19 Do you know -- this just occurs. Do you know why Q 20 the RCMP would be dealing with Vancouver victims of crime? 21 22 Α Well, my experiences with the RCMP behavioural 23 science group was that they were very committed to 24 doing what they could in terms of dealing with 25 predators of this nature for the whole province,

1	and of course a sex predator in Burnaby, very
2	likely to be operating in Vancouver and possibly
3	Coquitlam and North Vancouver, they don't know
4	these political boundaries, they're irrelevant to
5	their hunting practices, and so quite properly the
6	RCMP in this regard were looking at all the
7	information available within the province.
8	MR. VERTLIEB: Mr. Commissioner, I've gone on too long without
9	the break for the reporter, and it's my error and
10	I'm sorry, madam reporter, but perhaps we could
11	take a shortened break because I'd like to finish
12	with Professor Rossmo today.
13	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank you.
14	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing will now recess for ten minutes.
15	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:25 P.M.)
16	(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:38 P.M.)
17	THE REGISTRAR: Order. The hearing is now resumed.
18	MR. VERTLIEB: Mr. Commissioner, I'd like the material that
19	he's been referring to on the PowerPoint and the
20	slide presentation to be marked as a separate
21	exhibit at this time, please.
22	THE REGISTRAR: It will Exhibit number 67.
23	(EXHIBIT 67: Document entitled - PowerPoint
24	presentation by D. Kim Rossmo)
25	THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

1	MR. VERTLIEB	:
2	Q	Professor Rossmo, we come to then page 26, which
3		is Vancouver Serial Killers. So I'll just very
4		briefly take you through those. Clifford Olson we
5		don't need to discuss, except we've heard in
6		writings that there were the same kinds of issues
7		in that case that emerged in Pickton in terms of
8		communication interjurisdictional concerns?
9	А	Yes, that's correct.
10	Q	Gilbert Jordon?
11	А	Gilbert Jordon murdered a number of women in the
12		Downtown Eastside.
13	THE COMMISSI	ONER: He was the one that was plying them with
14		alcohol?
15	THE WITNESS:	That's correct.
16	THE COMMISSI	ONER: Gilbert Paul Jordon.
17	THE WITNESS:	Yes.
18	MR. VERTLIEB	:
19	Q	How many people was he implicated in? It was
20		numerous.
21	А	Yeah, it was numerous. I'm sorry, I don't have
22		the numbers. I wouldn't want to guess. Can I
23		just maybe say, Mr. Commissioner, is that all this
24		list is is what I could think of based on my own
25		knowledge. If we were to canvass all police

officers, especially going back in time, I'm sure 1 2 that we could come up with many more. I just 3 looked at the ones since I began my policing 4 career till I ended my policing career at 1980 to 5 2000. We also would have to add in those serial 6 killers that were operating below the radar of the 7 police that were never identified. I just wanted to point out that there were probably more serial 8 9 killers operating than we were aware, especially over a 20 year span, in the Greater Vancouver area 10 11 with the intention of making the point that this is going to happen again and it's most likely to 12 13 happen to the street prostitution community or 14 other marginal groups that make easy prey for these types of predators. 15 16 Q Thank you. Project Eclipse, there's three series, 17 but you covered that. Brian Allender, how many victims were involved? 18 He only was convicted of one, but he's strongly 19 Α 20 suspected by the RCMP of having done other 21 murders. In fact he may even be responsible for 22 some of the Project Eclipse series. You know, we 23 have both series and individuals here. So it's 24 generally believed based on what happened in that

particular crime that it was not his first.

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1 0 Go on. 2 And what I mean specifically is there was a lot of mutilation of the victim. 3 4 And one interesting comment, you've got Pickton Q 5 and you've put the date '95. Now, we realize 6 that's outside the terms of reference. I just 7 wanted to ask you why did you say '95? 1995 was the year that the cluster began, and I 8 Α 9 note that in terms of the -- what I read in the 10 media regarding the murders that he was initially 11 charged with the earliest was also 1995. Now, tell us about the next page. Why is that 12 Q 13 here for the commissioner to help him develop recommendations? 14 15 Just one more point, Mr. Commissioner. A couple Α of these series have an asterisk beside the name, 16 17 and I just want to point out their victims were not street prostitutes, but as you can see most of 18 19 this activity does involve street prostitution. 20 And the next chart just presents a little timeline 21 of when these individuals were operating. So, you 22 know, just statistically it's not at all unlikely 23 that there isn't a different and new serial killer 24 operating somewhere in the Greater Vancouver area. 25 I mean it's a recurring problem is really the

major point I'm trying to make here. 1 It's important to hear. So possible solutions. 2 0 3 Okay. So we've talked about the three factors Α 4 that form for this perfect storm, and we talked 5 about how they created problems or caused the 6 investigation to fail. This is just a few simple 7 solutions that are put forward to try to counteract some of these issues. 8 9 So the victims were sex trade workers. important for the police to have training in the 10 11 background, the life, the behaviour and the risks of sex trade work. Those police officers that I 12 13 worked with that knew this paid a lot of attention 14 to reports from prostitutes, 'cause they knew that 15 they would often be talking about very dangerous 16 people. Important in future investigations that 17 police officers who have experience with marginal 18 victim groups, and with the neighbourhoods where 19 the crimes are being talked to, be consulted with 20 regards to their specific domain knowledge about the area and about these individuals. 21 Do you have -- as it relates to the Downtown 22 0 Eastside, and what you've read and know of your 23 24 own work, is that a factor at play here?

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Α

Oh, definitely.

Give me an example, please? 1 Q 2 Well, the schism between Biddlecombe and Dave 3 Dickson who had a lot of knowledge of the area. But I also didn't see any effective integration 4 5 with the beat officers who worked that particular 6 area. And, you know, some of this may be lack of 7 time and resources, but remember what we said before about the groups that are more likely to 8 9 solve a crime would be the community, members of the community and then patrol officers. 10 Better communication with sex trade workers? 11 Q Right. And that also requires building some 12 13 levels of trust. So it's not something that 14 should be starting when an investigation has 15 begun, it's something that needs to be ongoing and nurtured. Like I said these people are likely to 16 17 be victims of some of the worst, most dangerous violent predators in society. And then the 18 19 importance for proper supervision and management 20 of these cases, and this is where the major case 21 management principles can help play a role. 22 Q Just on the supervision, you mentioned Deputy Chief McGuinness and others, does that go to the 23 24 cultural influences you mentioned earlier in 25 bringing in the concern about supervision and

management at the highest level? 1 2 Well, I mentioned earlier that I thought the VPD Α 3 suffered from a lack of managerial accountability, 4 so I think that played a role in this case at that 5 time. 6 You ascribe that to the systemic structure not Q 7 individual misconduct? Perhaps I would use the word subculture in the 8 Α 9 organization. And you can create organizational structures that get around that. For example, the 10 11 New York CompStat process which does create serious managerial accountability. 12 13 So the investigative difficulties? Q 14 Now focusing on the second point, Α 15 Mr. Commissioner, the fact that the victims' bodies were not discovered. This failure to find 16 17 any bodies permitted police management to delay committing to the serial murder scenario. I mean 18 19 ultimately they eventually did, but as discussed 20 this was 12 to 24 months later than it probably should have been, and in turn this allowed them to 21 22 avoid spending the resources needed for this type 23 of investigation. The next slide is a guess, but what I did 24 here was I looked at the \$70 million estimate for 25

the dig at the Pickton farm, but I've seen other 2 estimates of a hundred million dollars for the 3 investigation. Then I looked at the number of 4 people involved and the time periods involved and 5 estimated that that was going to be certainly less than one and a half million dollars. And as a 6 7 result I've estimated the pre-arrest expenditures at 2 percent, it's probably less. But where is 8 9 all the money gone? The money has all gone to 10 work, investigative work after the arrest. 11 Without taking anything away from the challenges and the difficulties of digging up the pig farm 12 13 and finding pieces of evidence that was a 14 relatively straightforward task. Other examples 15 have occurred in other agencies. There's protocols. It's like an archaeological dig. 16 17 real investigative challenge was the who done it, the pre-arrest charge. And, yeah, where do we see 18 19 the money going? After the arrest. So there just 20 was not the commitment to this case before the 21 arrest. The resources had not been put in place 22 at least up until 2001. THE COMMISSIONER: So you say that had the investigation been 23 24 done properly in your way, in -- in your opinion 25 we would have saved an enormous amount of money in

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this case because most of the money you say went 1 2 to post-arrest activities? 3 THE WITNESS: Sadly, Mr. Commissioner, I think I cannot say 4 that. 5 THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, okay. 6 THE WITNESS: And in fact maybe this is a very good point. 7 What if the Vancouver Police Department and the RCMP had done everything in a very timely fashion? 8 9 Maybe we have Robert Pickton arrested in early 1999. We get lucky, you get some breaks, the 10 11 resources are there, we would still have close to 30 murdered women, and we would still have had to 12 13 dig up the farm. So I mean this case is a 14 horrible tragedy, but it became a worse tragedy as 15 a result of some police blunders. And maybe something worth thinking about is what might have 16 17 happened, and I'm sorry I don't have any solutions for this, but what might have happened that would 18 19 have allowed us to catch Pickton even sooner, even 20 before he was brought to the attention of the 21 police. One thing does though -- one possibility 22 does relate to tracking missing persons better. 23 By the way, for the community to bring that to our 24 attention maybe we need to find ways of 25 identifying those patterns ourselves within a

1 police agency. 2 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. 3 THE WITNESS: So, Mr. Commissioner, turning to possible 4 solutions for the issue of victims' bodies not 5 discovered. This sort of echoes what we were just 6 talking about. We need better investigation of 7 missing person reports. Perhaps it would be worthwhile establishing a provincial level missing 8 9 persons database that has necessary information to allow the analysis of case trends, patterns and 10 11 potential problems. And then the last point I think is very 12 13 important. The police need to develop a 14 risk-based response. So we heard -- in LePard's 15 interview with Inspector Biddlecombe we hear these comments about I didn't have any evidence that 16 17 these murders were occurring, Rossmo's report was just intelligence, we don't launch investigations 18 19 based on intelligence. Well, that's actually 20 totally untrue. When I worked organized crime intelligence we launched multi-million dollar 21 22 investigations on the basis of intelligence. If 23 we have a terrorist threat the RCMP are going to 24 spend a lot of money and resources responding to 25 that as quickly as possible. So the police

sometimes, especially in homicide, have this until you can prove to us you have a murder we're not doing anything. And what I'm arguing is there needs to be a shift in onus to a risk-based response. So the risk-based response means what is the risk to your community? Maybe there isn't a serial killer, but we need to respond on some level even if there isn't because we don't know and because the risk is so great to the community. We need to be protective of that community, and if sometimes we waste resources for a false alarm so be it.

One of the things, you know, in a blueprint for the Missing Person Work Group was these safety initiatives which should have been started immediately because we don't necessarily want to leave these groups exposed to risk for the six months or the 12 months or whatever it takes us to figure out what's going on. And that has to be proactive, much more than just a couple of, you know, newspaper stories or, you know, issuing a few flyers. So the shift and onus to where we look at the risk to the community and then respond accordingly rather than prove to us you got a murder before we do anything.

### 1 MR. VERTLIEB: 2 Was the culture at the time one of investigative 0 3 onus rather than risk-based response? 4 Yes. And that's probably certain, but not unique Α 5 to the VPD. 6 Just on the discussion about risk to community and Q community and warning, you mentioned the Jane Doe 7 case. You actually gave evidence in that as an 8 9 expert witness for the benefit of the court? Yes, Justice MacFarland declared me as an expert 10 Α 11 witness as it relates to geographical patterns of serial crime and their appropriate investigative 12 13 response. 14 So this would be a systemic issue, this risk-based 0 15 response shifting from investigative onus? Yes, it would have to come in the managerial level 16 Α 17 what do we do under these circumstances, how do we get appropriately warrants, and then what should 18 19 we be doing? And not just homicide detectives, 20 the whole department. Mr. Commissioner, if I could just refer back to the outline for the 21 22 missing women work -- sorry. Okay. It's the last 23 page of my tab 12, the strategic blueprint 24 concludes with safety and crime prevention 25 initiatives involving everything from crime

prevention officers to the beat officers in District 2, working with the community groups and with the media. And none of that is homicide or investigation, but it should be hand and glove a parallel part of the investigation to help protect the community, because the *Police Act* makes it clear that one of the responsibilities of a police agency is the protection of its people.

- Q All right. So we now move to the jurisdictional question under investigative difficulties.
- A Yes, the third element, victims were murdered in a different police jurisdiction from where they went missing. This jurisdictional split allowed the VPD and the RCMP to avoid responsibility. And of course this problem was exacerbated by the uncertainty caused by the lack of bodies for finding the victims' bodies.

The next slide just shows an element from the British Columbia Police Act which says in separate sections of the provincial police force and the municipal police department must perform the duties and functions respecting the preservation of peace, and the prevention of crime and offences against the law. So it's clear that there is a responsibility to protect your community. And I

think the Act might refer to the Queen's subjects, it doesn't just limit it to the people in your own immediate jurisdiction, although administratively it is divided up that way.

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So the next slide, Possible Solutions, victim murdered in a different police jurisdiction from where they went missing. The best solution is the formation of a metropolitan Vancouver police department. The only reason we have a patchwork of all these different police agencies is a function of history and politics. Certainly it's not how you would design an optimal policing structure. If you take a look at the United Kingdom where they went regional in terms of much larger areas than we see here they went that way a long time ago. If we take a look at Continental Europe or Japan, they have very large agencies, sometimes national agencies, so responsibilities don't get divided by geography. Willie Pickton didn't care where he found his victims in terms of the political boundaries, and so that would be the best solution.

Q So let me just ask, if you were asked to design a police model that would suit the million and a half or two million residents of the Vancouver

1	area would you recreate the one that's in
2	existence now?
3	A Definitely not. It's balkanized. And as we see
4	here, and as we've seen before in other cases and
5	other problems, it has a certain level of
6	dysfunctionally because it's split up that way.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: You when we did the commission of inquiry
8	in the '90s you were one of our researchers, and
9	you'll recall at that time we examined this
10	issue
11	THE WITNESS: Yes.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: about regional policing, and the greatest
13	impediment came from the mayors in the
14	municipalities. So what's your solution to that?
15	THE WITNESS: I'm afraid politics are outside of my area.
16	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. You don't have to answer that.
17	THE WITNESS: Given, Mr. Commissioner, as you just said the
18	extreme political challenge of the creation of
19	such an entity, that at a minimum there should be
20	formal protocols for investigation co-ordination.
21	This is something the VP this case is something
22	the VPD shouldn't have just handed off, there
23	should have been a formal structure which included
24	accountability and lines of communication back to
25	Vancouver.

## 1 MR. VERTLIEB: 2 Just explain that. Handed off you mean what, and 0 3 formal lines of communication, just tell us about 4 t.hat.? 5 I think that the Vancouver Police Department Α 6 devolved some of its responsibility to the 7 Coquitlam RCMP in terms of the pursuit of a very good suspect in terms of the women missing from 8 9 Vancouver, and I don't think they should have done that. I understand it was a resource issue, but 10 11 what should have occurred is a more formal co-ordination process where the VPD first of all 12 13 has to be consulted, and also everything has to be 14 communicated and they get tied together. I mean 15 very likely this is what occurred with Project

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Q You mentioned accountability built into the formal protocol. How would that work? What would you envision?

much later than it should have happened.

Evenhanded, the only problem is that it happened

A Well, if I could look at the next one, I think there should be political and legal institution of mutual accountability and responsibility. So integrate it into the *Police Act*, for example, and prevent any sort of buck passing. The protocols

can be determined by the police agencies that 1 2 exist in the province about do we have such a 3 cross-jurisdictional crime problem, how do we 4 handle it, and it should prevent any one agency 5 from washing their hands of the problem. Okay, 6 you've got it now, your problem, we're going to go 7 do these other things. So probably through MOUs, memorandum of understandings, that type of thing. 8 9 But I'm also arguing the third point for a more formal establishment of accountability and 10 11 responsibility for all involved agencies. And then finally the last point is procedures within 12 13 each organization to prevent such cases from 14 falling between the cracks. 15 What you're speaking to and the possible Q solutions, can you help the commissioner with 16 17 whether or not this is novel or has this been implemented in other countries in the western 18 world? 19 20 Some of them have been, some of them haven't been. Α 21 For example under number three, most agencies that 22 have -- or many agencies that have dealt with the multi-jurisdictional problem have regionalized, or 23 24 what seems to be very popular in the United States

is the establishment of regional intelligence

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centres. In terms of the victims' bodies not 1 2 being discovered, I understand that the Vancouver 3 Police Department have gone a long ways to 4 improving their missing persons section, but I 5 think the issue of the tracking of the missing 6 persons is when it's not done most places, 7 especially in the United States. What does that mean? 8 Q 9 Α They just don't do a lot with missing persons. So I think that's a problem that exists many places. 10 11 And as for victims, sex trade workers, the 12 solutions there, again I think the VPD has done a 13 lot in this area, and I think other places have as 14 well. Of course in some jurisdictions 15 prostitution is not illegal so the problem isn't 16 as severe. The major case management principles, 17 that's sort of a Canadian product, it's a very good product, and I don't know which police 18 19 organizations in Canada have adopted it, which 20 have not, but it probably is something that 21 everyone should be doing. So I guess in answer to 22 your question it's a mix. Some of these things have been done elsewhere, some have not. 23 24 So that brings us to your last comment. Q 25 And of course after hearing you speak this Α

morning, Mr. Commissioner, this slide I think is 1 2 redundant, but maybe it's just worth while 3 emphasizing that a lot of these problems have been identified in the past starting with Lord Byford's 4 5 report after the Yorkshire Ripper case in the 6 United Kingdom, the internal review the Royal 7 Canadian Mounted Police did after the Olson case, all the analyses that occurred in the Seattle King 8 9 County area case of the Green River, and then of course recently the excellent Justice Archie 10 11 Campbell's inquiry report which should have been required reading for any major crime section 12 13 detective, especially management in the Vancouver 14 Police Department, in fact any police department 15 in Canada. 16 Q Do we take it that you agree with Mr. Justice 17 Archie Campbell's comments about human failings and these errors need to be protected against 18 19 through proper systems being implemented? 20 Yes, I would, because we're always going to have Α 21 human failings, we can do our best to minimize 22 them, but the best way forward is a proper 23 organizational structure, procedures, policies, 24 laws, training that minimize these problems and 25 provide some sort of escape if they do occur. Can I maybe just give you one of what I think is a very good example?

Q Please.

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In the United Kingdom, which I'll point out has a Α homicide clearance rate of over 90 percent compared to low 60 percent in the United States, they have established a procedure that after one year if a homicide is not solved the case goes to a senior investigating officer from another police agency to review. This isn't your drinking buddy or one of your friends, this is someone looking to advance their career by finding all the things that you missed and all the things you didn't do. This results in two things. One is the original investigator knows that someone's going to be taking a look at their case, so they make sure they do their best, cross their T's and dot their I's. The other thing is if it's unsolved you get a fresh set of eyes, a fresh perspective, and that can be invaluable, because all of us tend to lock into a certain way of looking at things. there's a really good example of the introduction of a policy that helps increase the solve rate for homicides to get around some inherent human failings associated with bias, which is of course,

1		you know, critical examination of our own work.
2		It's like to trying to find the typos in something
3		you've written. You may not find them, but if you
4		give them to somebody else they can easily see
5		them.
6	Q	Just on the clearance rate, and we may have heard
7		it and I may have forgotten, do you have a sense
8		of that statistic here in Canada?
9	A	I know that it's better than the United States,
10		but not as nearly as good as the United Kingdom.
11		I also know it varies somewhat by city and
12		province, but I'm sorry, that's all I know at this
13		point in time.
14	Q	That's something you could get us in the future?
15	A	Yes, I suspect it would not be difficult. I could
16		get it at a national level.
17	MR. VERTLIEB	: Again, Mr. Commissioner, I appreciate we've gone
18		past the normal time. What I'd like to do is
19		break now and I want to review and see if there's
20		any other area I need to cover, I'm not sure there
21		is. And given the fact of the hours I've heard
22		about from participants I think we should start at
23		9:30 tomorrow morning.
24	THE COMMISSI	ONER: All right. Thank you.
25	THE REGISTRA	R: The hearing is now adjourned until 9:30

1	tomorrow morning.
2	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 4:09 P.M.)
3	I hereby certify the foregoing to be a
4	true and accurate transcript of the
5	proceedings transcribed herein to the
6	best of my skill and ability.
7	
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9	Peri McHale
10	Official Reporter
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presentation by D. Kim Rossmo)

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